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 ABSTRACT 
 
ERIC CONRAD STEINHART: The Transnistria’s Ethnic Germans and the Holocaust, 
1941-1942 
(Under the direction of Christopher R. Browning) 
 
 
In the eyes of Nazi Germany, the ethnic Germans or die Volksdeutschen—people 
of German ancestry who lived beyond the prewar borders of the German state—inhabited 
an ambiguous racial territory.  Because the SS alone controlled the ethnic German 
settlements in the Transnistria, a region that encompasses much of present-day Moldova 
and western Ukraine, it was able to enact radical policies that constricted the decision-
making space in which ethnic Germans chose to become Holocaust perpetrators.  In 
contrast to their endangered position under Soviet rule, those ethnic Germans who 
supported the Transnistria’s new Nazi order received material rewards from their SS 
overlords.  But those ethnic Germans whom the SS found politically and racially 
objectionable felt the regime’s unrestrained brutality.  Using both German and Soviet 
sources, this thesis examines the relationship between this exceptional context and the 
crimes of the Transnistria’s ethnic German auxiliary police during the winter of 1941-42. 
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1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the winter of 1941-42, the ethnic German auxiliary police murdered more than 
35,000 victims in the Transnistria, including much of Odessa’s once extensive Jewish 
population.1  The region’s estimated 130,000 ethnic Germans or die Volksdeutschen—
people of German ethnicity who lived beyond the prewar borders of the German state—
played a crucial role in the Nazi regime’s genocidal plans in the Soviet Union.2  Perhaps 
nowhere was their contribution as central as in the Transnistria, an area that encompasses 
much of present-day Moldova and western Ukraine.  Although the region’s 
Volksdeutsche had no particular historical affinity for Germany, after a matter of months 
under German occupation, a disproportionate number of them joined in murdering the 
Third Reich’s racial and political enemies in large numbers.  In addition to providing 
crucial manpower for the Final Solution, during two and a half years of occupation these 
Volksdeutschen communities were focal points of the SS’s (Schutzstaffel) effort to 
transform distant villages into colonial outposts of its planned Aryan utopia in Eastern 
Europe.  Creating the SS’s racial paradise involved implementing two coeval projects.  
First, the Transnistria’s SS administrators murdered a racially and politically suspect
                                                 
1 Jean Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-1942: The Romanian Mass Murder Campaigns, trans. Rachel Garfinkel 
and Karen Gold, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: The Goldstein-Goren Diaspora Research Center, Tel Aviv 
University, 2003), 292. 
2 National Archives Microfilm Publication T175, roll 72, frame 2589159. (Hereafter T175/72/2589159.) 
 
 Volksdeutsche minority.  Second, the SS created an impressive welfare administration for 
the majority of the area’s ethnic Germans.  How did these apparently countervailing 
initiatives shape the Holocaust in the Transnistria?  How did German policy influence the 
apparent willingness of the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen to take up arms against and to 
murder the Nazi regime’s racial and political enemies?  And most importantly, how does 
the context in which ethnic Germans decided to kill inform our understanding of 
Holocaust perpetrators?  In responding to these issues, the present thesis attempts not 
only to further scholarship on the Volksdeutschen during the Third Reich, but also 
addresses the unique role that ethnic German murderers played in the Holocaust in the 
Soviet Union. 
The answers to these questions, in large measure, rest upon the relationship between 
Volksdeutsche perpetrators and their Nazi masters.  While recent scholarship on Eastern 
European murderers provides useful insights into Volksdeutsche killers, it fails to 
consider the impact of their special position in the Nazi racial hierarchy.3  As the works 
of Doris Bergen, Ingeborg Fleischhauer, and Valdis O. Lumans illustrate, Nazi Germany 
never viewed ethnic Germans as wholly racially acceptable.4  On the one hand, since the 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the uniquely personal dimension to mass murder and the Holocaust in Eastern 
Europe, see Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and 
Ukraine, 1941-44 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), viii.  Christoph Dieckmann’s recently edited 
volume, Kooperation und Verbrechen, suggests that Eastern Europeans cooperated with German authorities 
largely out of self-interest.  Although his distinction between collaboration and cooperation is useful in 
discussing Eastern European perpetrators, it does not to take into consideration the Volksdeutschen who 
sought immediate gains from Nazi Germany’s new order.  Christoph Dieckmann, Kooperation und 
Verbrechen: Formen der "Kollaboration" im östlichen Europa 1939-1945, Beiträge zur Geschichte des 
Nationalsozialismus; Bd. 19 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 9-21. 
4 Doris L. Bergen, "The Nazi Concept of 'Volksdeutsche' and the Exacerbation of Anti-Semitism in 
Eastern Europe, 1939-45," Journal of Contemporary History 29, no. 4 (1994): 573.; Ingeborg Fleischhauer, 
Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte; Nr. 46 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), 68-72.; Valdis O. Lumans, Himmler's 
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 beginning of the twentieth century, Pan-Germanists saw Eastern European Volksdeutsche 
as the bulwark of a potential German empire in the East.  Prior to and during the Second 
World War, the Nazi regime “resettled” hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans from 
Eastern Europe to the Greater German Reich and actively recruited them for service in 
military and auxiliary forces.5  On the other hand, using malleable and imprecise 
definitions, the Nazis racially categorized ethnic Germans as a means of culling the most 
desirable Aryan specimens.6  Ethnic Germans whom the Nazi regime found racially or 
politically objectionable were subject to the loss of property rights, imprisonment, and 
even extermination.  The Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen were particularly problematic for 
the Nazis, because for centuries they had lived among, intermarried with, and assumed 
the customs of their supposedly inferior Slavic and even Jewish neighbors.  Thus, within 
this schizophrenic Nazi worldview, the regime regarded the Volksdeutschen, and 
particularly those in the Transnistria, as simultaneously desirable and suspect. 
Given the peculiar position of ethnic Germans within the Nazi racial hierarchy, 
conventional scholarship on Holocaust perpetrators does little to explain this distinctive 
                                                                                                                                                 
Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 72. 
5 Lumans provides the most comprehensive English-language discussion of Nazi Volksdeutsche 
“resettlement” policy.  Lumans.  Himmler’s Auxiliaries.  Götz Aly aptly notes that the term “resettlement,” 
as opposed to settlement, is a product of Nazi ideology.  Götz Aly, 'Final Solution': Nazi Population Policy 
and the Murder of the European Jews, trans. Belinda Cooper and Allison Brown (London: Arnold, 1999), 
11. 
6 Doris Bergen’s 1994 article provides important insight into the tenuous nature of the Nazi definition of 
an ethnic German.  Bergen.  "The Nazi Concept of 'Volksdeutsche.’" 
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 group of killers.7  Although an extensive body of literature examines the role of ethnic 
Germans during the Second World War, it generally debates the extent to which they 
were a “fifth column” for Hitler’s Germany, rather than analyzes their unique dynamic as 
perpetrators.8  Moreover, due to its focus on German killers, much of the seminal 
Holocaust scholarship does little to explain the context in which numerous ethnic 
Germans decided to kill.9  In their examination of German perpetrator cohorts, many 
scholars therefore correctly dismiss the conventional postwar perpetrators’ claim that 
they were coerced into participating in the Holocaust.10  While it is clear that no German 
                                                 
7 Doris L. Bergen, "The Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe and the Collapse of the Nazi Empire, 1944-
1945," in The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy, ed. Alan E. 
Steinweis and Daniel E. Rogers (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 103-5.  
8 Louis De Jong wrote the classic work on this topic.  Louis De Jong, The German Fifth Column in the 
Second World War, trans. C.M. Geyl (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 295-97.  Meir 
Buschweiler and Valdis Lumans provide more nuanced understandings of ethnic Germans as a “Fifth 
Column” by suggesting that one can only apply the label to certain circumstances.  Meir Buchsweiler, 
Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs--ein Fall doppelter 
Loyalität? trans. Ruth Achlama (Tel-Aviv: Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte, Universität 
Tel-Aviv, 1984), 384.  Lumans, Himmler's Auxiliaries, 80, 87.  Given the imprecision of these categories, 
Richard Blanke perhaps correctly dismisses the entire debate as irrelevant.  Richard Blanke, "The German 
Minority in Inter-War Poland and German Foreign Policy -- Some Reconsiderations," Journal of 
Contemporary History 25, no. 1 (1990): 97.  For an interesting East German perspective on the debate 
concerning the Volksdeutschen as a “Fifth Column” see Eva Seeber, "Der Anteil der 
Minderheitsorganisation "Selbstschutz" an den faschistischen Vernichtungsaktionen im Herbst und Winter 
1939 in Polen," Jahrbuch für Geschichte der sozialistischen Länder Europas 13, no. 2 (1969): 3-34. 
9 Christopher R. Browning offers a social psychological explanation for mass murder.  Christopher R. 
Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, 2nd ed. (New 
York: HarperPerennial, 1998), 159-223. By contrast, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen argues that perpetrators 
killed solely because of a fervent and particularly violent anti-Semitism. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's 
Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 9.  
Herbert Welzer attempts to remedy some of Goldhagen’s limitation, but by virtue of focusing on Germany, 
provides an explanation that is limited to perpetrators socialized in the German national political context.  
Harold Welzer, Täter: Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt: S. Fischer 
Verlag, 2005). 
10 For example, both Christopher R. Browning and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen studied a unit in which the 
commanding officer explicitly offered his troops the option of not participating.  As Browning notes, “in 
the past forty-five years no defense attorney or defendant in any of the hundreds of postwar trails has been 
able to document a single case in which refusing to obey an order to kill unarmed civilians resulted in the 
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 perpetrator committed murder under duress in a strictly legal sense, SS policy in the 
Transnistria ensured that the area’s Volksdeutschen decided to kill within a 
fundamentally different situation. 
Although a number of works examine ethnic German communities in the Soviet Union 
and specifically in Ukraine during the Second World War, they neither typically focus on 
the Holocaust, nor make significant use of postwar judicial records.11  Those works that 
do address ethnic German auxiliaries during the Holocaust, such as Christian Jansen and 
Arno Weckbecker’s study of the Volksdeutschen Selbstschutz (ethnic German militia) in 
Poland, as well as Thomas Casagrande’s recent examination of the Waffen-SS’s “Prinz 
Eugen” Division in Yugoslavia, do not address ethnic German perpetrators in the Soviet 
Union.12  Similarly, while Götz Aly’s inquiry into the relationship between Nazi ethnic 
German population policy and the Final Solution highlights an important connection 
between the two initiatives, he does not specifically examine crimes committed by 
Volksdeutschen.13  Moreover, although the German-occupied Soviet Union, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
allegedly inevitable dire punishment.”  Browning, Ordinary Men, 170.  This is not to suggest that ethnic 
Germans perpetrated their crimes under direct fear of punishment.  Like German perpetrators, no evidence 
indicates that threat of direct physical harm was a motivating factor for Volksdeutsche Holocaust 
perpetrators. 
11 Although Fleischhauer addresses the Holocaust, it is neither the central focus of her work, nor does 
she marshal extensive judicial evidence.  Fleischhauer.  Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der 
Sowjetunion.  Similarly, Buchsweiler’s study, whose account does not go beyond the initial few months of 
the German occupation, focuses primarily on the daily life of ethnic Germans under Soviet and German 
rule. Buchsweiler.  Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine. 
12 Christian Jansen and Arno Weckbecker, Der "Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz" in Polen 1939/40 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1992).  Thomas Casagrande, Die volksdeutsche SS-Division "Prinz Eugen": die Banater 
Schwaben und die nationalsozialistischen Kriegsverbrechen (Frankfurt: Campus-Verlag, 2003). 
13 Aly, 'Final Solution.' 
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 specifically Ukraine, are hotbeds of current research, few of these new works focus on 
the specific role that the region’s Volksdeutschen played in the course of the Holocaust.14  
Despite the fact that Jean Ancel’s examination of the Holocaust in the Romanian-
occupied Transnistria, Andrej Angrick’s study of Einsatzgruppe D, and Wendy Lower’s 
work on Nazi imperialism in Ukraine note the prominent part that ethnic Germans played 
in the Final Solution, they all focus on the region’s German or Romanian rulers rather 
than on the Volksdeutschen themselves.15  Thus, while emerging scholarship has raised a 
number of interesting questions about the role of ethnic Germans in the Holocaust in the 
Soviet Union, none of it attempts to examine specifically the unique role of the 
Volksdeutschen in carrying out the Final Solution. 
Using postwar Soviet and West German judicial interrogations (see Appendix), as well 
as contemporary German documents, this thesis endeavors to reconstruct how the 
                                                 
14 With the opening of archives in the former Soviet Union fifteen years ago, historians have turned their 
attention to the role of Eastern European perpetrators in bringing about the Holocaust in the Soviet Union.  
Recent scholarship, like that of Karel Berkhoff, Bernhard Chiari, Martin Dean, Christoph Dieckmann, 
Christian Gerlach, Shimon Redlich, and Timothy Snyder now provides a nuanced view of the crucial 
contribution of non-German Holocaust perpetrators in the Soviet Union.  Although these works are of 
exceptional quality, few of these studies focus on the decisive role of the Volksdeutschen in bringing about 
the Holocaust in the Soviet Union.  While Berkhoff, for example, refers to ethnic Germans in Ukraine, he 
bases most of his information on Buchsweiler.  See Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death 
in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).;   
Bernhard Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weissrussland 
1941-1944, Schriften des Bundesarchivs; 53 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1998).;  Dean, Collaboration in 
the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-44.;  Dieckmann, Kooperation 
und Verbrechen: Formen der "Kollaboration" im östlichen Europa 1939-1945.;  Christian Gerlach, 
Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944 
(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999).;  Shimon Redlich, Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, 
and Ukrainians, 1919-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).; and  Timothy Snyder, The 
Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003). 
15 Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-1942.  Andrej Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: Die 
Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion 1941-1943 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003).  Wendy 
Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, 2005). 
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 Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche auxiliary police became involved in the Final Solution and 
why an extraordinarily high proportion of the region’s ethnic Germans chose to commit 
murder.  The crimes of the Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche auxiliary police resulted from an 
intersection of Romania’s and Germany’s parallel “wars of destruction.”  The reason why 
the SS used the Volksdeutschen auxiliary police as killing personnel was a direct 
response to Romanian policy.  As a consequence of its own genocidal anti-Jewish policy 
and in explicit contravention of stated German wishes in late 1941 and early 1942, the 
Ion Antonescu regime (1940-44) deported Odessa’s remaining Jewish population to the 
nearby ethnic German settlements.  Because of the horrific conditions in which 
Romanian authorities had housed Odessa’s Jews, many deportees suffered from typhus 
and thereby threatened to spread the epidemic to the area’s Volksdeutschen and to nearby 
German military units.  In the context of the SS’s murderous racial worldview, the only 
solution to the public health dilemma created by their Romanian allies was to murder the 
Jewish typhus carriers.  Put simply, the deportation policies pursued by Romanian 
officials prompted the SS and its local ethnic German helpers to solve the Jewish 
“problem” for them. 
Although Romanian policy triggered the involvement of the Transnistria’s ethnic 
German auxiliary police in the Final Solution, the overarching situational factors created 
by the region’s SS overlords provides a crucial background for understanding why the 
local Volksdeutschen chose to become mass murderers.  Because the SS exercised 
virtually unrestrained control in the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen communities, it was 
able to establish Nazi rule by fusing two distinct but related projects with a physical and 
chronological intensity greater than anything the regime attempted in Germany.  While 
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 Nazi officials created their new order by brutally repressing a small politically and 
racially suspect minority among the Volksdeutschen, they also sought to construct an 
impressive welfare system for the majority of the Transnistria’s ethnic German 
inhabitants.16  The region’s SS rulers thus telescoped policies that the Nazis had enacted 
piecemeal over the course of years in Germany into the span of weeks, days, and even 
hours in the Transnistria.  In contrast to the uniquely intense Volksdeutsche anti-Semitic 
context that scholars conventionally highlight, the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans appear 
to have been unusually integrated with local Jews.  In particular, as indicated by the SS’s 
radical stance toward mixed Jewish-Volksdeutsche families, the Transnistria’s Nazi 
rulers enforced a uniquely rigid and brutal racial policy.  The ferocity of SS rule thus 
created a constricted decision-making space for local ethnic Germans by making the 
penalties for recalcitrance and the rewards for cooperation much more visible, immediate, 
and severe than was the case for any German. 
 
                                                 
16 Based on his case study of Nordheim, a town in Niedersachen, William Sheridan Allen highlights the 
fact that the Nazi regime gained power in Germany both by repressing its political enemies and by 
providing material gains to the majority of Germans.  William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: 
The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945, Rev. ed. (New York: F. Watts, 1984).  Although 
perhaps somewhat overstating the evidence, Götz Aly highlights the importance of material rewards for the 
German public in facilitating the Holocaust.  Götz Aly, Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und 
nationaler Sozialismus (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 2005). 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ETHNIC GERMAN AUXILIARY POLICE AND THE HOLOCAUST 
 
The Ethnic Germans of the Transnistria 
 Taking advantage of tax remunerations, military service exemptions, assurances of 
religious freedom, and other incentives initiated by Catherine the Great, German-
speaking people—now known as the Black Sea Germans—settled the area immediately 
to the north of Odessa between 1804 and 1810.17  Like their counterparts who relocated 
to the New World, German émigrés in the Russian Empire sought both freedom from 
religious persecution and poverty.18  Although the Volksdeutschen of the Transnistria—
defined technically as the Kutschurgan enclave—were predominately Catholic, they 
encompassed a high-proportion of religious minorities, such as Mennonites, as well as 
Lutherans and Baptists.19  During the nineteenth century, like their counterparts across 
European Russia, the ethnic Germans of the Transnistria prospered in agriculture.  Prior 
to the Russian Revolution, the Volksdeutschen of Ukraine owned and farmed between
                                                 
17 Archivgut der Zentralen Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltung 2315/5 (Hereafter Barch B 162).  
Buchsweiler, 109. 
18 Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, 10-11. 
19 Ibid., 118.  Eric J. Schmaltz and Samuel Sinner, "The Nazi Ethnographic Research of Georg 
Leibbrandt and Karl Stumpp in Ukraine, and Its North American Legacy," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 
14, no. 1 (2000): 34. 
 
 40,000 and 45,000 square kilometers—an area approximately one and a half times the 
size of the state of Maryland.20  In the countryside surrounding Odessa the ethnic 
Germans, who comprised 7 percent of property owners at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, owned approximately 60 percent of the land.21  Living in noncontiguous 
settlements that dotted the region outside of Odessa, the Volksdeutschen inhabited largely 
ethnically homogeneous Germanophone villages prior to 1917.22  Notwithstanding their 
linguistic and cultural heritage, as the prosperous descendants of religious and economic 
exiles, the Black Sea Germans, like much of the German-speaking population of the 
Russian Empire, felt little particular attraction to their ancestors’ erstwhile homeland.23
 If the Russian Empire’s ethnic Germans grew increasingly distant from Germany, by 
virtue of their geographic and economic position, they became increasingly interesting to 
German ultranationalists at the dawn of the twentieth century—a pattern that would 
continue until 1945.  As early as 1905, Pan-Germanists looked to Russian Volksdeutsche 
as a potential fifth column in a future war of expansion in the East.  Although only noble 
and upper bourgeois ethnic Germans in the Baltic shared this affinity prior to 1914, at the 
                                                 
20 According to the 1897 census, more than half of the Russian Empire’s German-speaking population 
worked in agriculture, and by 1914, they farmed over thirty-five million acres of land—equivalent to 43 
percent of the arable land in the German Empire.  Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der 
Sowjetunion, 12. Throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, the overwhelming majority of 
Russian ethnic Germans were rural.  Polian argues that of the 1.4 million Soviet ethnic Germans prior to 
the Second World War, only 20 percent lived in urban areas.  Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History 
and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR, trans. Anna Yastrzhembaska (Budapest: Central 
European University Press, 2004), 126. 
21 Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine, 121. 
22 Ibid., 111. 
23 Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, 11. 
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 beginning of the First World War the tsarist government took repressive measures against 
all Volksdeutschen living along the western edges of the Empire.24  Russian fears about 
the loyalty of their ethnic German community were realized, at least in part, during the 
brief German occupation of the Russia Empire at the end of the First World War.  In 
pursuing a policy of Pan-German expansion, German forces established and armed an 
ethnic German militia force to guard the Volksdeutschen against violence from local 
Slavs.25  As the German Empire disintegrated, many nationalistic Volksdeutschen fled 
Russia with the German army.26  In subsequent decades, this cohort of ultranationalist 
ethnic Germans would form both one of the intellectual antecedents to National 
Socialism, as well as a disproportionate number of the specialized personnel trusted to 
carry out Nazi Germany’s “war of annihilation” in the Soviet Union.27
                                                 
24 Ibid., 14, 17-22, 23.  Also see, Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against 
Enemy Aliens During World War I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
25 Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine, 118-19. 
26 Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, 26-27, 32-34. 
27 As Ingeborg Fleischauser aptly argues, this cohort of primarily Baltic ethnic Germans had a profound 
impact on shaping the agenda of the Nazi Party.  For example, Alfred Rosenberg, a Volksdeutscher from 
Tallinn, was one of the chief ideologues of the Nazi Party.  Furthermore, Wirtschaftspolitischen Aufbau-
Korrespondenz über Ostfragen und ihre Bedeutung für Deutschland, written by another Baltic ethnic 
German, Max von Scheubner-Richter, had an important impact on Adolf Hitler’s conception of 
Lebensraum in Russia.  Ibid., 36-40.  The complicity of ethnic Germans born in the Russian Empire, 
however, was not limited to the intellectual realm.  Both Dr. Georg Leibbrandt, who represented the 
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories at the Wannsee Conference, and Dr. Karl Stumpp, who led a 
special command (Sonderkommando) that conducted racial-biological and statistical surveys of occupied 
Ukraine, were both born near Odessa.  Schmaltz and Sinner, “The Nazi Ethnographic Research of Georg 
Leibbrandt and Karl Stumpp in Ukraine.”  For a discussion concerning the Nazi skepticism about the 
quality of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union see Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der 
Sowjetunion, 54. 
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  For the majority of ethnic Germans who remained in the Soviet Union, and specifically 
in Ukraine, the bloody civil war and subsequent collectivization campaign led to 
widespread suffering, destruction, and loss of life.  Notwithstanding some measure of 
cultural autonomy that the Soviet authorities granted ethnic Germans, their general living 
conditions from 1917 until 1941 plummeted.28  First, because of their extensive 
landholdings under the tsarist regime, Soviet officials disproportionately identified 
Ukrainian ethnic Germans as kulaks.  Despite the fact that Volksdeutsche comprised less 
than 2 percent of Ukraine’s population, they accounted for some 15 percent of all 
kulaks.29  As a result, Soviet authorities deported large numbers of ethnic Germans 
during the course of “dekulakization.”30  Second, like their Ukrainian neighbors, the 
ethnic Germans suffered from mass starvation during the Great Famine of 1932-33, 
which was particularly severe in western Soviet Ukraine, and claimed the lives of 10 
percent of Ukraine’s population.31  If the statistical information collected by the SS is any 
indication, the social dislocation that the Volksdeutschen of Ukraine experienced in the 
                                                 
28 Buschweiler argues that although some ethnic Germans hoped to establish cultural autonomy under 
Soviet rule, most Volksdeutschen became quickly disenchanted with the Soviet system.  Buchsweiler, 
Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine, 135. 
29 Ibid., 222.  Although Kate Brown notes that the deportation orders issued by Soviet administrators 
initially did not specify national criteria and continued to use the language of class treason, she nevertheless 
illustrates how deportation authorities applied these definitions to individuals that the regime classified as 
Germans.  Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 133. 
30 Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine, 223. 
31 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 8. 
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 decade and a half prior to the Second World War was tremendous.32  Out of a total ethnic 
German population of 313,305, German occupation authorities estimated that the Soviets 
deported over 51,000 Volksdeutsche—roughly 16 percent of the population—in various 
campaigns during the 1930s.33  Although the speed of the German advance in 1941 
prevented Soviet authorities from forcibly relocating many of the Transnistria’s ethnic 
Germans, the SS nevertheless estimated that Soviet forces deported over 7,500 ethnic 
Germans out of a population of 130,000—approximately one in twenty.34  In addition, 
one in sixty ethnic German children in the Transnistria was orphaned and thus registered 
as a ward of German occupation authorities.35  As one Volksdeutscher recounted in his 
1962 statement to West German investigators: 
I attended the primary school in my home village and, as soon as I finished, I 
had to work in agriculture for the Russians.  As a result, I could not learn a trade.  
Before the German invasion, I hid from the Russians to avoid the risk of being 
                                                 
32 For a discussion of the seemingly indiscriminate violence launched against Soviet citizens by Soviet 
security services in the late summer of 1941 see Ibid. 
33 “Zusammenstellung: der aufgebauten kulturellen Einrichtungen von Sonderkommando ‘R’.” T175/ 
72/2589157, 2589167.  Although caution is necessary when employing SS-collected demographic 
information, the authors circulated copies of their reports to Heinrich Himmler.  If the authors were 
intentionally deceiving Berlin about the condition of Ukraine’s ethnic Germans, the authors would have 
likely attempted to mitigate the social dislocation within the community.  As a number of factions within 
the Nazi hierarchy were skeptical about the viability of Soviet ethnic Germans as the vanguard for the new 
Nazi order in the East, it was to the advantage of the authors, who operated in Ukraine, to show the strength 
of the communities in order to support their own work.  Schmaltz and Sinner: "The Nazi Ethnographic 
Research of Georg Liebbrandt and Karl Stumpp in Ukraine," 47. 
34 T175/72/2589157, 2589167.  As one ethnic German from the Transnistria indicated to investigators, 
many ethnic Germans hid following the invasion of the Soviet Union in order to avoid deportation.  Barch, 
B 162/2297/7.  As Berkhoff notes, one of the reasons for the speed of the German advance was a general 
unwillingness of the Soviet population to take up arms in defense of the regime.  Berkhoff, Harvest of 
Despair, 12-13. 
35 Ibid. 
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 deported.   After the German Army came in fall 1941, we received our land back 
and were permitted to work for ourselves again.36
Put simply, even before the German invasion, the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen were an 
embattled community that sought any relief from Soviet authorities. 
If their suffering under Soviet rule embittered many Volksdeutschen toward the Soviet 
state, the last days of Soviet rule ignited the embers of ethnic German discontent.  The 
Red Army’s brutal retreat and the Soviet repression of the Volksdeutschen, as 
exemplified by Stalin’s August 1941 order to deport the Volga Germans, cut any 
remaining affinity that members of the community may still have felt toward the Soviet 
Union.  Within this context, many future ethnic German perpetrators suffered 
personally.37  Some of the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans sought revenge even before 
German forces arrived.  For example, as the Red Army retreated through the 
Volksdeutsche village of Worms, a Volksdeutsche settlement approximately seventy-five 
kilometers northwest of Nikolaev, a local forty-year-old ethnic German dairy worker 
opened fire on the retreating soldiers with a rifle from the roof of his house.38  This futile 
and likely foolish attack by the town’s future mayor even before the arrival of German 
forces illustrates the pent-up hostility that many ethnic Germans felt toward the Soviet 
regime.  Thus, while the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen were not uniquely attracted to 
Germany prior to the First World War, they generally greeted the arrival of German 
                                                 
36  Barch, B 162/2297/7. 
37 One former ethnic German auxiliary policeman from Rastadt, for example, recounted how Soviet 
authorities had deported his father in 1933.  Barch, B 162/2315/105. 
38 Barch, B 162/2313/142-3. 
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 troops, as did many of their Ukrainian neighbors, as liberators from the yoke of Soviet 
oppression. 
 
Special Command Russia and the Transnistria 
 While völkish thinkers and ethnic German immigrants continued to include the Soviet 
Volksdeutschen in their plans for Lebensraum in the East during the interwar period, the 
Second World War brought the role of ethnic Germans to the fore.39  In October 1939, 
Hitler appointed Heinrich Himmler as Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of 
Germandom (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums), and charged him 
with three tasks.40  First, he was to retrieve all Volksdeutschen living abroad and 
“repatriate” them to the Greater German Reich.  Second, he was to purify the German 
Volk by expunging harmful biological and political elements.  Third, he was to supervise 
the resettlement of ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe in order to strengthen Germany’s 
claims to these lands.41  For Himmler, Volksdeutsche were thus the beneficiaries of the 
new Nazi order, a racially and politically suspect population for the SS to classify and to 
“cleanse” through selection and murder, as well as an invaluable source of accomplices. 
                                                 
39 As Fleischhauer illustrates, German plans for the East (Generalplan Ost) called for the establishment 
of German colonies in the Soviet Union to secure a German empire in Eastern Europe.  Fleischhauer, Das 
Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, 75.  As Doris Bergen argues, the existence of ethnic 
German communities in Eastern Europe was a crucial justification for the Nazi regime to go to war—so 
much so that she contends that it would have even invented these settlements to make its argument.  Bergen, 
"The Nazi Concept of 'Volksdeutsche,'" 570. 
40 Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, 63. 
41 Valdis O. Lumans, "A Reassessment of Volksdeutsche and Jews in the Volhynia-Galacia-Narew 
Resettlement," in The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy, ed. Alan E. 
Steinweis and Daniel E. Rogers (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 85. 
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  The chief arm of Himmler’s Volksdeutsche policy was the SS-run Ethnic German 
Liaison Office (die Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle), which was led, after 1937, by SS-
Lieutenant General (Obergruppenführer) Werner Lorenz, a trusted associate whom 
Himmler had assigned to secure Hamburg in the midst of the 1934 Röhm purge.42  
Although created in 1935 as a nominally independent Nazi party organization, the staff of 
the Ethnic German Liaison Office quickly joined the SS and, after the beginning of the 
war, its number of career SS-officers increased.  After a brief two years of existence, in 
1937 the Ethnic German Liaison Office assumed responsibility for all Volksdeutsche 
affairs, and the following year, Hitler endowed it with state authority.43  Thus, by the 
beginning of the Second World War, ethnic German matters were the bailiwick of 
Himmler’s SS.44
 Himmler was sorely disappointed by the largely urban Baltic Volksdeutschen that the 
Ethnic German Liaison Office had “called home to the Reich” during its resettlement 
campaign in 1939 because of their unsuitability as agricultural colonists in the East.  
Undaunted, the Reichsführer had great expectations for potential racial specimens from 
the predominately rural ethnic German communities of the Soviet Union.45  On July 11, 
1941, three weeks after the invasion of the Soviet Union, Himmler ordered the Ethnic 
                                                 
42 Lumans, Himmler's Auxiliaries, 43.  As Lumans illustrates, by November 1944 Lorenz was listed as 
the fifteenth-ranking SS officer.  Ibid., 49. 
43 Ibid., 64-66. 
44 Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, 73. 
45 Imbued with the Nazis’ bucolic fascination, Himmler was convinced that the ethnic Germans of the 
Soviet Union would meet the Nazis’ romantic agrarian ideals.  Lumans, "A Reassessment of Volksdeutsche 
and Jews," 85. 
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 German Liaison Office to create a special unit to organize the country’s ethnic Germans.  
The result was Bureau VII, which, unlike other departments of the Ethnic German 
Liaison Office, was directly accountable to Himmler.  As one of the three command posts 
of Bureau VII, Special Command Russia (Sonderkommando R[ußland]) was responsible 
for enacting Nazi Germany’s manifold plans for the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen.  In 
contrast to previous German efforts to relocate ethnic Germans to the Greater German 
Reich, Himmler entrusted Special Command Russia with the task of establishing a Nazi 
racial utopia in the Transnistria.46
In September 1941, Special Command Russia assumed direct and complete 
responsibility for the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen communities.  Although Germany 
granted Romania control of the Transnistria in August 1941, German officials made no 
arrangements with their Romanian counterparts, who were chagrined at the presence of a 
cadre of arrogant and demanding SS officials.47  Special Command Russia’s status would 
not be resolved until the unit’s commander, Horst Hoffmeyer, hammered out an 
agreement with Gheorghe Alexianu, the local Romanian governor, in Odessa during the 
second week of December 1941.48  Despite the fact that Special Command Russia 
initially operated with no official authorization from Romanian officials, the unit began 
establishing an autonomous SS-administration within Romanian-occupied territory.49  
                                                 
46 Barch, B 162/2297/91-92. 
47 Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-1942, 300-1. 
48 Ibid., 306. 
49 Some authors term this arrangement a “state-within-a-state” in reference to the fact that Special 
Command Russia assumed many of the functions of a state.  The term state, however, is deceptive in the 
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 Commanded by Hoffmeyer’s assistant Dr. Klaus Siebert from September 1941 until his 
promotion in March 1943, Special Command Russia established its Transnistrian 
headquarters in the ethnic German settlement of Landau, approximately fifty kilometers 
northwest of Nikolaev.50  With a staff of twenty SS and fifty NSKK (National Socialist 
Motor Corps—Nationalsozialistischer Kraftfahrkorps) personnel, Siebert’s unit 
organized its command post in the former Soviet government building.51  To replace the 
provisional ethnic German authorities, whom Einsatzgruppe D appointed in August, the 
following month Special Command Russia created thirty Regional Commands 
(Bereichkommandos) in occupied Soviet territory, eighteen of which were in the 
Transnistria.52  Over the coming weeks and months, these Regional Commands were to 
become the nuclei for all interaction with the Soviet Union’s Volksdeutschen.  In addition 
to a Regional Command in Odessa, Special Command Russia established Regional 
Commands in major ethnic German settlements like Alexanderfeld, Bischofsfeld, Groß-
Liebental, Landau, Lichtenfeld, Janowka, Halbstadt, Helenental, Hoffnungsthal, 
Mannheim, Marienberg, Neudorf, Rastadt, Rosenfeld, Selz, and Worms (Figure 1).53  
Because Nazi officials frequently claimed jurisdiction over land that had belonged to 
ethnic Germans prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, Regional Commands typically 
                                                                                                                                                 
sense that the SS never controlled a consecutive territory, but rather small pockets of ethnic German 
settlements.  Ibid., 301-2. 
50 Barch, B 162/2297/88-9, 92.  Barch, B 162/2315/23. 
51 Barch, B 162/2315/227. 
52 Barch, B 162/2297/92.  Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, 109-10. 
53 Barch, B 162/2297/92.  Barch, B 162/2315/24.   
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 controlled a cluster of smaller surrounding ethnic German settlements as well as the 
54
Figure 1.  Ethnic German Settlements between Odessa and Nikolaev circa 1942. 
 
adjacent farmland, thus creating pockets of German rule in Romanian-occupied 
territory.55  Siebert quickly assigned at least two German officials to each Regional 
                                                 
54 “Deutsche Kolonien (Vorkriegsstand),” T175/72/2589129. (Large script my additions.) 
55 Barch, B 162/2315/310.  As Jean Ancel notes, after decades of Soviet rule, many of these “ethnic 
German” villages were no longer homogenous.  German officials thus had to engineer some of these 
settlements by deporting Ukrainians and importing ethnic Germans from other parts of Ukraine.  Ancel, 
Transnistria, 1941-1942, 301-2. 
 19
 Command: an SS-officer with a typical rank of captain (Hauptsturmführer) to act as the 
Regional Commander (Bereichkommandant) and an enlisted SS or NSKK member as his 
assistant.56  By mid-September 1941, Special Command Russia had effectively 
established its control over the Transnistria’s ethnic German settlements. 
 
The Final Solution in the Transnistria 
 The heat generated by the friction between Germany and Romania’s genocidal plans 
kindled the crimes of the Transnistria’s ethnic German auxiliary police.  Since archival 
access began during the early 1990s, Romania’s participation in the Holocaust has been 
the subject of much research.57  While Romania’s overall genocidal policies remain 
beyond the scope of the present study, it is important to note that Ion Antonescu’s 
Romania was initially a willing, and, as the Holocaust in the Transnistria demonstrates, 
even a zealous participant in the destruction of European Jewry. 
 For Antonescu, the territory bordered by the Dniester and Bug rivers and the Black Sea 
was not merely a crucial territorial component of his historical fantasy of transforming 
Romania into greater Dacia, but it was also a “garbage dump” for Romania’s unwanted 
ethnic and religious minorities, such as Jews.58  In the early years of the war, Romania 
deported 160,000 Jews from Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Dorohoi to the Transnistria, 
                                                 
56 A prime example of this pattern is the Regional Command in Helenental.  Barch, B 162/2315/311. 
57 Radu Ioanid provides one of the best surveys of Romania’s complicity in the Holocaust.  Radu Ioanid, 
The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940-44, 
trans. Marc J. Masurovsky (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000). 
58 Ibid., 176-77. 
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 under such terrible conditions that only 135,000 expellees reached their destination.59  
Furthermore, the Transnistria was the primary location of Romania’s contribution to the 
Holocaust.  Out of a total wartime Jewish population of approximately 285,000 in the 
Transnistria, which included indigenous and deported Jews, approximately 250,000 died 
during Romanian rule as a result of both outright murder as well as the grisly conditions 
imposed by the region’s Romanian overlords.60  Carried out with a rare intensity, 
Romania’s independent genocidal project in the Transnistria dovetailed with the Nazi 
regime’s Final Solution. 
 The crimes of the ethnic German auxiliary police during the winter of 1941-42 were a 
direct consequence of the Romanian regime’s decision to clear Odessa of its remaining 
Jewish population in retaliation for its own military ineptness during Operation 
Barbarossa.  Insistent that the Romanian army prove its metal against Soviet forces, 
Antonescu ordered the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies to attack Odessa without 
German assistance.  The assault began on August 18, 1941, but it soon became bogged 
down and Romania was ignobly forced to seek German assistance, which arrived on 
September 24.  Despite heavy casualties on both sides, the Soviet command did not 
evacuate by sea until October 16, thereby denying the Romanian army its quick, decisive 
victory.61  After two months of combat, the badly mauled Romanian army entered the 
city and pillaged the Transnistria’s planned provincial capital.  During the initial days of 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 177. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-1942, 90. 
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 the occupation, Romanian forces vented their frustration by murdering as many as 8,000 
civilians, and targeting specifically the city’s remaining 70,000 Jews, who had not fled 
with the retreating Soviet forces.62
 Romanian hostility toward the city’s Jews dramatically increased after a bomb planted 
by the Soviets destroyed the Romanian General Staff headquarters, located in the former 
NKVD building, on October 22.  In addition to killing more than fifty Romanian and 
German soldiers and officers, the bomb claimed the life of General Glogojanu, Odessa’s 
new Romanian military commander.  To add insult to injury, the Romanian military had 
received creditable intelligence reports indicating that the building was booby trapped 
prior to the explosion, and yet took no preventative action.63  Based on fantastic claims 
that Odessa’s Jews had triggered the bomb by a remote detonator, on Antonescu’s orders 
the Romanian army rounded up many of the city’s Jews and, over the course of the next 
three days, brutally murdered between 18,000 and 25,000 men, women, and children in 
the nearby suburb of Dalnic.64
 Despite the Romanian army’s bloody rampage, in the wake of the Odessa debacle, the 
Antonescu regime was unable to deport the city’s remaining Jews.  Upset that Romania 
was trying to expel vast numbers of Jews into the occupied Soviet Union, Germany had 
secured an agreement with its Romanian allies that prevented immediate deportation of 
Jews across the Bug River, the border between Romania’s Transnistria and Germany’s 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 183, 120. 
63 Ibid., 186. 
64 Ibid., 188-203.  Ioanid provides a slightly higher estimate of 25,000 Jewish victims at Dalnic.  Ioanid, 
The Holocaust in Romania, 182. 
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 Reichskommissariat Ukraine.  According to section seven of the Tighina Treaty, signed 
on August 30, 1941, because “the deportation of Jews across the Bug is currently not 
possible … they [the Jews] must therefore be placed in concentration camps and put to 
work until operations are complete and a deportation to the East is possible.”65  While a 
subsequent agreement on November 11, 1941, between Alexianu and German authorities 
permitted local deportation of Jews to facilitate ghettoization, it held that Romanian 
authorities were not to deport Jews to German-occupied territory.66  Thus, even at the 
peak of the Romanian army’s massacre of Jews in Odessa, the number of Jews in the 
Transnistria nevertheless grew dramatically because of the country’s ongoing deportation 
campaign, while treaty obligations prevented it from employing its favored anti-Jewish 
measure of deportation farther east. 
 This inherent tension came to a head during a December 16, 1941, cabinet meeting in 
Bucharest.  Following a report on the situation of Odessa’s Jews that Alexianu had 
submitted to the cabinet, the Transnistria’s governor described the current state of 
Romanian Jewish policy in the city.  Downplaying the typhus epidemic that raged among 
Odessa’s increasingly ghettoized Jews, Alexianu emphasized his own plan of putting 
able-bodied Jews to work and imprisoning the rest of the city’s Jews in the Soviet naval 
base near Ochakov.67  Obviously frustrated by what he regarded as a lack of progress on 
the Jewish question, Antonescu turned to Alexianu and bellowed: 
                                                 
65 “Vereinbarungen über die Sicherung, Verwaltung und Wirtschaftsauswertung der Gebiete zwischen 
Dnjestr und Bug (Transnistrien) und Bug und Dnjepr (Bug-Dnjepr-Gebiet).” T120/3132/E510834. 
66 “Verordnung Nr. 23; 11 November 1941,” T120/3132/E510822-25. 
67 Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-1942, 223-4. 
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 The Germans want to bring all the Yids from Europe to Russia and settle them 
in specific areas, but it will take time until this is actually carried out.  What will 
we do with [the Jews] in the meantime?  Wait for a decision that affects us?  
Guarantee their safety?  Pack them into the catacombs!  Throw them into the 
Black Sea!  But get them out of Odessa!  As far as I’m concerned, a hundred can 
die, a thousand can die, they can all die!68
 
At Antonescu’s behest, immediately after the cabinet meeting Alexianu issued orders to 
the Romanian Third Army, stationed in Odessa, to begin deporting Jews.69
 Although there is no direct evidence that Alexianu or the Transnistria’s other 
Romanian administrators knew that these deportations would prompt Special Command 
Russia to murder Odessa’s Jews, their choice of deportation sites suggests that they 
courted this possibility.  While local Romanian officials were to determine the specific 
deportation locations, Alexianu explicitly selected the northern Ochakov and the southern 
Berezovka districts as collection points for Odessa’s Jewish deportees.  On the one hand, 
these sites offered easy access to temporary bridges that the German military had erected 
across the Bug River, and would have facilitated an easy deportation into German-
occupied territory at the conclusion of military operations against the Soviet Union.70  On 
the other hand, Alexianu must have known that these deportations would have entailed 
marching thousands of typhus-carrying Jews directly through the Landau headquarters of 
Special Command Russia.  From this location, Odessa’s deported Jews not only 
threatened to contaminate the area’s racial purity but posed a public health emergency in 
                                                 
68 Quoted in Ibid., 226. 
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 the eyes of the area’s SS administrators.71  By either deporting Odessa’s Jews to the 
northern reaches of the Transnistria or prompting the area’s ethnic Germans to murder 
the city’s Jews for the Romanians, Alexianu accomplished his goal of annihilating 
Odessa’s Jewish population. 
 It is important to note that the German fear of typhus that Alexianu successfully 
exploited in the winter of 1941-42 resulted from a medical reality created by the 
implementation of racist perceptions.  According to German medical assumptions, Jews 
were often infested with body lice that carried the typhus-causing Rickettsia bacteria.72  
Thus, for German doctors, the German medical term for typhus, Fleckenfieber (spotted 
fever), quickly became known as Judenfieber (Jew fever).73  In order to combat the 
inherent public health hazard caused by typhus-infected Jews, German medical personnel 
in occupied Poland were among the first to advocate ghettoization as a means of 
quarantining the supposedly infectious Jews from the rest of the population.74  Given the 
appalling overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and scarcity of food, typhus became “the 
                                                 
71 Ancel suggests that “the convoys transported to Berezovka and Veselinovo were not directed 
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 ghetto disease par excellence.”75  The result was that the Nazis created a “self-fulfilling 
prophecy” whereby supposedly diseased Jews were placed in a situation that was 
guaranteed to make them contract typhus.76  Moreover, with limited typhus outbreaks in 
Breslau, Dresden, and Nuremberg during the winter of 1940-41, which German 
authorities attributed to forced laborers and prisoners of war from Eastern Europe, the 
connection between typhus and supposedly racially inferior peoples became self-
reinforcing.77  As German authorities increasingly ghettoized Jews under the guise of 
disease control measures, they created the situation in which their racist fears became 
medical reality. 
 In the context of Hitler’s “war of annihilation” in the East, anti-typhus measures 
became inexorably linked with mass murder.  Even before the Wehrmacht crossed the 
Germano-Soviet frontier in the summer of 1941, the German Army’s medical staff was 
concerned with its personnel’s susceptibility to typhus.78  In light of the fact that the 
German Army was to operate in the western Soviet Union, and precisely in the area of a 
1921 typhus epidemic, the German military’s medical staff feared that the region’s 
inhabitants would have a higher natural immunity to typhus than German soldiers from 
the typhus-free Reich.79  Although neither Hitler, nor the German General Staff initially 
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 shared the fears of their medical officers, by the winter of 1941-42 typhus prevention 
became a German military priority.80  Disease control thus evolved into a twofold policy.  
First, German personnel were to take great care in exterminating the bacteria-carrying 
lice that spread typhus.  To combat typhus, the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern 
Territories constructed a series of delousing stations throughout its domain, and the 
German Army issued strict guidelines for soldiers’ personal hygiene.81  Second, the SS in 
particular had orders to murder suspected typhus carriers under the pretext of proactive 
public health.82  Regardless of the fact that high rates of typhus infections among Jews 
and Slavs was a product of German policy, these orders illustrate that the connection 
between genocide and public health was rapidly becoming the SS’s standard operating 
procedure in the occupied Soviet Union by the winter of 1941-42. 
 Three points are crucial in understanding the role that the fear of a typhus epidemic 
played in the SS’s specific decision to murder Odessa’s Jews.  First, it is almost certain 
that many of the city’s Jews were infected with typhus.  Both Romanian and German 
sources attest to a typhus epidemic in Odessa’s ghettos.  Second, typhus was a direct 
consequence of abysmal living conditions created by Romanian rule, and could have 
been prevented had the Romanian occupiers given any thought to the health of their 
Jewish captives.  Given the heinous living conditions that Romanian authorities imposed 
on the city’s Jews, it would have been remarkable had they not suffered from typhus.  
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 Third, although typhus is not transmitted by person to person contact, German officials 
viewed the illness as a public health hazard to be treated like a highly contagious 
communicable disease.  Thus the SS justified murder as a public health measure, in that 
its decision to kill Odessa’s Jews was primed by Nazi policy to murder suspected non-
German carriers of typhus.  In short, both the reason for the typhus epidemic and the SS’s 
murderous solution resulted from a particular anti-Semitic worldview. 
 It was this precise constellation of factors that Romanian authorities exploited when 
they began to deport Odessa’s Jews.  Beginning sporadically in mid-December 1941 and 
continuing virtually daily from January 12, 1942, to February 25, 1942, trains transported 
on average one to two thousand Jews from the Sortirovka station in Odessa to Berezovka, 
a nearby provincial center.83  Prior to departure, representatives of the Romanian 
National Bank sent especially from Bucharest robbed the Jewish deportees of any 
remaining valuables.84  During the extreme cold of the Soviet winter of 1941-42, when 
temperatures dipped to -35 degrees Fahrenheit, as many as 20 to 25 percent of deportees 
perished prior to arriving at their destinations.  The Romanian gendarmerie that guarded 
the transports halfheartedly incinerated the corpses of those who succumbed to the cold 
in order to quell the spread of typhus.85
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  As most of the documentation generated by Special Command Russia, limited though 
it likely was to begin with, does not appear to have survived the war, the specific chain of 
events that led to the participation of Special Command Russia and its ethnic German 
auxiliary police cannot be charted with complete certainty.  Nevertheless, a likely path to 
the Final Solution can be constructed.  In mid-December 1941, the SS staffs assigned to 
Worms, Lichtenfeld, and Rastadt reported to Special Command Russia’s headquarters in 
Landau that Romanian authorities were driving thousands of Jews from Odessa into the 
Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche settlements.  Special Command Russia’s Landau command 
center responded by ordering local SS commanders to keep the Jewish deportees out of 
the settlements, using force if necessary.86  As local SS officers ordered their 
Volksdeutsche auxiliaries to begin murdering the Jews prior to Christmas 1941, this 
decision to kill likely preceded Hoffmeyer’s authorization from Himmler sometime the 
following year.  Based on postwar testimony, Angrick has recently argued that 
Hoffmeyer traveled to Berlin in January 1942 to consult with Himmler and to receive the 
Reichführer’s authorization to begin murdering the recently deported Jews.  Angrick 
further contends that before ordering his own command to begin killing the local Jews, 
Hoffmeyer contacted Otto Ohlendorf, the commander of Einsatzgruppe D, and requested 
that he return to the Transnistria in order to murder the Jewish deportees.  Because 
Special Command Russia’s settlements remained in Romanian-occupied territory, in 
which Einsatzgruppe D was not allowed to operate, Ohlendorf declined.87  Hoffmeyer 
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 thus returned to Landau from Berlin and ordered his local SS commanders to begin 
murdering the Jews.  Barring any conclusive evidence to the contrary, Angrick’s 
reconstruction seems plausible. 88  However, regardless of whether Hoffmeyer received 
authorization from Himmler in January 1942 or later, it is clear that the latter only 
granted his endorsement after Special Command Russia began to murder the recently-
arrived Jews in late December of the previous year. 
 Ironically, the very success of Romania’s deportation policy appears to have both 
accelerated Special Command Russia’s killing efforts in the short-term and spelled its 
own demise in the long run by provoking loud German diplomatic objections.  During the 
second half of December 1941 and the first half of January 1942, the number of deportees 
from Odessa appears to have been relatively small.  Beginning on January 12, 1942, 
however, Romanian occupation authorities dramatically ramped up deportations from 
Odessa, in which, with one exception, at least one and as many as three trains departed 
daily from Sortirovka station for the next six weeks.  Given the harsh winter and the poor 
quality of coal that the Romanians had available to fire their locomotives, this rate of 
deportation is particularly impressive.89  Nevertheless, just as Romanian deportations 
intensified during the first week of February 1942 (three transports departed on February 
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 2, two on February 3, and two on February 4) German occupation officials on the other 
bank of the Bug River began to voice their objections.90
On February 9, Generalkommissar Oppermann of Nikolaev called Erich Koch in 
Rowno by radio telephone and complained that “a large number of Jews, who are hardly 
being properly buried, are dying daily” on the opposite bank of the Bug.91  In 
Oppermann’s view, “this impossible situation will pose a great danger for the ethnic 
German villages in Transnistria and for the bordering area of the Reichskommissariat 
Ukraine.”92  Four days later, Oppermann again complained to Koch that the Romanians 
had deported 6,500 Jews to the west bank of the Bug immediately opposite his command 
post in Nikolaev, and that in nearby Wosnesensk the Romanians had delivered an 
additional 8,000 Jews “without sufficient security.”93  Furthermore, Oppermann reported 
that, according to a Romanian border patrol officer, the Romanians were deporting up to 
an additional 60,000 Jews toward the Bug.94  Moreover, individual groups of Jews had 
attempted to cross the border into the Reichskommissariat.95  Oppermann also reiterated 
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 that unless the deportations stopped, typhus would be a serious threat both to the German 
military as well as to the Transnistria’s ethnic German settlements.96  Acknowledging 
that their Romanian allies were “practically deporting” Jews in violation of the Tighina 
Treaty, Koch ordered Oppermann to keep a fifty kilometer swath of the Bug River’s west 
bank clear.97  Koch was apparently so concerned about the public health menace that 
these Jews posed to his bailiwick that he ordered his subordinate to operate in territory 
that, according to the Tighina Treaty, fell inside of the Romanian occupation zone. 
While Koch ordered his field officers to take stopgap measures to prevent the 
deportation of Jews from the Romanian-occupied Transnistria to German-occupied 
Ukraine, his office passed these concerns on to the Interior Ministry and the Reich 
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which in turn asked the Foreign Office to 
intervene with Bucharest.98  Although the Foreign Office quickly forwarded these 
complaints up the chain of command, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop 
concluded on February 13 “that the imprecise claims of a local commander are not 
sufficient cause for diplomatic intervention.”99  Apparently reluctant to risk alienating a 
close ally, the Foreign Office was initially unwilling to broach this topic with its 
Romanian counterpart. 
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 Nevertheless, after continued complaints from the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern 
Territories, which included copies of the written complaints of local German officials, the 
Foreign Office eventually raised the issue with the Romanian government in late March 
1942.100  According to German ambassador Manfried von Killinger’s report to the 
Foreign Office on March 26, 1942, he broached the issue with Mihai Antonescu, the vice 
president of the Council of Ministers.  The latter assured von Killinger that although he 
would seek a mutually convenient solution to the problem, because “he was not informed 
about the details,” he would first have to consult his subordinates.101  Given that Mihai 
Antonescu was a member of the Council of Ministers and, as indicated by his extensive 
postwar testimony, intimately familiar with Romania’s Jewish deportations, it appears 
that his excuses to von Killinger were merely an effort to stall German requests while 
Alexianu completed the rest of the Odessa expulsions.102  Although the German Foreign 
Office pursued the issue at least through early June 1942, with the exception of continued 
deportations in late March and early April, the Romanians had removed most of Odessa’s 
remaining Jewish population by late February.103
Oppermann’s specific complaints about the public health implications of Romania’s 
Jewish deportations to the Bug cut to the very heart of why German officials were so 
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 alarmed, and why, until the deportations could be stopped diplomatically, Special 
Command Russia murdered these newly-arrived Jews with such alacrity.  While by early 
1942 it was certainly the Nazi regime’s intention to murder every last Jew whom it could 
capture, including those in Romanian-occupied Transnistria, German officials had no 
plans to kill this cohort of Jews while military operations were still underway.  In fact, as 
indicated by the Tighina Treaty the previous year, it was the Nazi regime’s express policy 
not to deport the Transnistria’s Jews across the Bug for the foreseeable future.  By 
driving large numbers of Jews, whom German officials correctly suspected of carrying 
typhus, through Volksdeutsche settlements and toward the German occupation zone, and 
by haphazardly disposing of their victims’ corpses, Romanian Jewish policy prompted 
local Nazi officials to murder.  So long as the number of deportees remained relatively 
small, as they did during the first month of deportations, the SS and its ethnic German 
auxiliaries killed approaching Romanian-guarded Jewish columns without provoking the 
ire of German administrators across the Bug River.  When, however, Romanian officials 
dramatically increased the number of deportations and Jewish deportees began 
approaching the border between the two territories, German officials in the 
Reichskommissariat Ukraine vociferously objected and demanded a halt to further Jewish 
transports.  By the time that the German Foreign Office was willing to bring sufficient 
diplomatic leverage to bear on Romania, Alexianu and his henchmen had successfully 
solved Odessa’s “Jewish problem” by handing it over to Special Command Russia. 
 
The Crimes of the Transnistria’s Ethnic German Auxiliary Police 
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 In order to understand how Special Command Russia perpetrated its killings, which 
amounted to more than 35,000 murders during the winter of 1941-42, it is first important 
to tease out the specific organizational structure of the auxiliary police units.104  Shortly 
after arriving in the Transnistria in early September 1941, Special Command Russia 
expanded the militia units that it had inherited from Einsatzgruppe D into an auxiliary 
police force.105  After establishing their Regional Commands, Regional Commanders 
instituted compulsory auxiliary police service for all ethnic German males seventeen to 
thirty-five years of age.106  Oftentimes local Regional Commanders announced the 
formation of the auxiliary police units in public assemblies.  In the ethnic German 
settlement of Neudorf, for example, the local SS commander called a meeting of all 
Volksdeutschen fit for military service and announced the formation of a police force to 
guard against partisans and thieves.107  In a number of instances, SS officers and local 
ethnic German commanders visited reluctant Volksdeutsche at home, and apparently did 
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 not permit any ethnic German men to excuse themselves from service.108  As one 
Volksdeutscher pithily observed to Soviet investigators, “no one asked for our 
consent.”109  Notwithstanding the personal and peer pressure that the area’s Regional 
Commanders brought to bear on the region’s ethnic Germans, there is no evidence that 
the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen initially knew that their SS superiors would soon ask 
them to murder.  In fact, the initial formation of the auxiliary police was reminiscent of 
the militias that Germany established in Ukraine during the First World War.  Given that 
Special Command Russia created these police units months prior to the beginning of 
Romanian deportations, it is possible that the area’s SS commanders were unaware that 
their ethnic German subordinates would play a prominent role in the Final Solution.  
Nevertheless, by the late fall of 1941, Special Command Russia instituted a policy that 
dramatically increased the number of auxiliary policemen under its command. 
As a result of these vigorous recruiting efforts, the size of the Volksdeutsche auxiliary 
police ballooned.  In Speyer, for example, the fifteen-man militia established by 
Einsatzgruppe D increased to a force of fifty to one hundred ethnic German men between 
September 1941 and early 1942.110  Although this increase in the Transnistria was not 
unique, by the height of the occupation 7,000 of Ukraine’s nearly 13,000 ethnic German 
auxiliary policemen were in the region.111  Out of an adult male population of 
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 approximately 33,000, more than one out of five of the Transnistria’s ethnic German men 
served in the region’s auxiliary police—a statistic that does not include ethnic Germans 
serving in either German or Soviet armed forces.  Moreover, of the twenty-seven 
auxiliary police training schools in Ukraine, Special Command Russia established sixteen 
of them in the Transnistria.  To be sure, the Transnistria’s distance from the front can 
explain in part why a region with a third of Ukraine’s ethnic German population had over 
half of all ethnic German auxiliary policemen and nearly two-thirds of all training 
institutions.112  Nevertheless, the disproportionate number of ethnic German policemen in 
the Transnistria also suggests that after Romanian deportations commenced in the winter 
of 1941-42, Special Command Russia expanded its ethnic German police force in 
response to its new genocidal mission. 
Because the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans were largely farmers, Regional 
Commanders divided their forces into active and reserve units to accommodate the 
region’s agricultural cycle.113  Active duty units, which comprised only a fraction of the 
total force, served in a full-time capacity and received wildly varying amounts of 
training—ranging from a few weeks to a few months—at established police academies 
located in larger ethnic German settlements like Landau, Worms, Rastadt, and 
Adolfstal.114  For example, one former member of the active auxiliary police allegedly 
trained for two months at one of the two training schools in Nikolaev.  Although only 
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 anecdotal evidence is available, it appears that members of the active auxiliary police 
units were younger than their reserve counterparts.115  In Worms, for example, one 
witness confirmed that the members of the local active unit were between seventeen and 
twenty-one years of age.116  According to Soviet trial records, the eleven defendants who 
were former members of the auxiliary police in Worms were on average born in 1921, 
making them all roughly twenty years old at the times of their alleged crimes.117  In 
addition, some scholars argue that younger ethnic Germans were more ideologically pro-
Nazi than their elders.118  Thus, the active duty auxiliary policemen appear to have been 
young ethnic Germans who, unlike their older colleagues, could train for lengthy periods 
of time away from their homes and were possibly more committed National Socialists. 
Reserve units of older ethnic German men, in which the majority of auxiliary 
policemen served, often had only a few days of local training typically supervised by 
either German members of the Regional Command or the unit’s ethnic German leader.  
The reserve units typically assembled on Sundays—the only day free from agricultural 
responsibilities—to drill at the local auxiliary police headquarters.  Like their active duty 
counterparts, reserve unit members took an oath both to serve Germany and to obey 
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 Hitler unquestioningly.119  As reserve units comprised more than three quarters of all 
auxiliary policemen in some areas, large missions, such as mass shootings that the ethnic 
German auxiliary police perpetrated in the winter of 1941-42, typically required joint 
operations of both active and reserve units. 
In the case of one massacre in January 1942 outside of Worms, former auxiliary 
policemen recalled how German and Romanian authorities led the Jewish victims into the 
area on a particular Sunday evening.120  The timing of this massacre raises the interesting 
possibility that the auxiliary police often perpetrated its crimes on Sundays when 
sufficient numbers of reserve policemen were already assembled for training.  Moreover, 
from Special Command Russia’s perspective, it was fortuitous that the Romanian 
deportations took place during the winter of 1941-42.  Had these expulsions occurred 
during other seasons, these Volksdeutsche perpetrators would have been occupied on 
their farms, and thus unavailable for such duty.  According to 1942 estimates by German 
police authorities in Kiev, of the Transnistria’s estimated 5,000 ethnic German auxiliary 
policemen, only 250 could serve during the summer months.121  Thus, anecdotal evidence 
raises the possibility that both the composition of the Transnistria’s ethnic German 
auxiliary police and the specific timing of its crimes were a product of the agricultural 
cycle of the region’s ethnic German communities. 
                                                 
119 Barch, B 162/2315/26-8. 
120 Barch, B 162/2313/130. 
121 Barch, B 162/2315/27. 
 39
  In addition to the age differences between the members of the active and reserve 
auxiliary police units, the majority of ethnic German auxiliary policemen had little 
education.  Many policemen had attended elementary school, but few if any had more 
than a basic education.  A significant proportion of this cohort was likewise illiterate.  For 
example, when the NKVD interrogated the surviving members of the Rastadt active 
auxiliary police unit more than a decade after the war, the court noted that nearly a 
quarter of the defendants were either completely or functionally illiterate.122  Like 
members of the largely Slavic local police in Belarus and other parts of Ukraine, it 
appears that most of the Transnistria’s ethnic German policemen were peasants with little 
formal education.123
 Similar to other German-organized Eastern European assistants, the Transnistria’s 
ethnic German auxiliary police was poorly equipped.124  Their weapons, almost 
exclusively small arms, were mostly obsolete captured Soviet firearms of various makes 
and models.  Both active and reserve units typically drew their weapons and ammunition 
from the local auxiliary police command post prior to their assignments.  Special 
Command Russia established the typical command post in a preexisting former Soviet 
government building or other suitable structure.  In one case, the auxiliary police 
established its command center in the home of one policeman’s father.  In addition to 
housing the unit’s armory and administrative offices, the local command post also served 
                                                 
122 Barch, B 162/2313/33-35. 
123 Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, 74. 
124 Ibid., 68. 
 40
 as barracks for the local active duty auxiliary policemen.  Uniforms for both the active 
and reserve auxiliary policemen were initially nonexistent.  Special Command Russia 
thus issued ethnic German auxiliary policemen armbands marked with a swastika that 
they wore on their left arms while on duty.  Although the Regional Commander typically 
had an automobile at his disposal, most ethnic German auxiliary policemen traveled by 
foot or on horseback.  In contrast to the well-equipped, motorized Einsatzgruppen that 
rolled across the Soviet Union in a murderous campaign, the Transnistria’s ethnic 
German auxiliary police was generally poorly trained and badly supplied.125
The participation of the Transnistria’s ethnic German auxiliary police in the Holocaust 
had less to do with their own characteristics than with the Nazi regime’s need for killing 
personnel in the Transnistria.  One of the paradoxes that the Nazi leadership faced as it 
sought to implement its genocidal policies was that the Holocaust could only take place 
under the cloak of global war.  While the Second World War provided the opportunity for 
the “Final Solution,” it nearly robbed Himmler and his henchmen of the personnel needed 
to see their bloody plans to fruition.  As Browning aptly recognizes, Nazi planners did 
not use members of the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei) reserves as killers because of 
their ideological purity or their political reliability.  Rather, they used these middle-aged 
reserve policemen because the Order Police contained some of the only available 
personnel.126  As a sign of their desperation, German officials even opened special 
training camps that included German-language education for non-Germanophone recruits, 
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 and culled passing Soviet POW columns for Germanic-looking Red Army soldiers.127  In 
light of this personnel crisis, the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans were a crucial manpower 
pool from which the Holocaust’s architects could draw at precisely the time at which 
Special Command Russia needed killers. 
Because the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans were not German citizens, they were 
ineligible for German military service.128  Moreover, by virtue of Special Command 
Russia’s agreements with Romanian occupation authorities and Himmler’s preeminent 
position in ethnic German affairs, there were no international or domestic obstacles to 
using the Transnistria’s ethnic German auxiliary police as killing personnel.  Furthermore, 
because of the alarmingly small number of ethnic German men in the Transnistria, 
Himmler refused to deploy the area’s ethnic Germans outside of their localities for fear 
that doing so would deplete the communities’ reproductive capabilities.129  In fact, it was 
not until after the German military setbacks at Stalingrad that, in February 1943, 
Himmler stationed the region’s auxiliary police units outside of the Transnistria.130  
During late 1941 and 1942, the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans remained one of the only 
sources of manpower that had yet to be mobilized for the war effort. 
                                                 
127 Mark P. Gingerich, "Waffen SS Recruitment in the "Germanic Lands," 1940-1941," The Historian 59, 
no. 4 (1997): 827.  Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, 88. 
128 Lumans, Himmler's Auxiliaries, 39. 
129 Ibid., 246-47. 
130  Ibid. 
 42
 Although further research into the crimes of the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans is 
necessary, the example of the ethnic German auxiliary police unit that operated around 
Rastadt during the winter of 1941-42 illustrates a number of important features to the 
killings.  The German Army occupied Rastadt, an ethnic German settlement of between 
two and three thousand residents, on August 11, 1941.131  The following month, SS-
Captain (Hauptsturmführer) Rudolf Hartung and two NSKK sergeants (Sturmführer) 
established Regional Command XIV in the town’s parsonage and founded an ethnic 
German auxiliary police force.132  As mentioned above, Hartung’s Rastadt unit was one 
of the first to report the Romanian deportations to Hoffmeyer in Landau and also one of 
the first to begin killing. 
While it is difficult to reconstruct the specific circumstances surrounding each of the 
ten to twenty massacres that Hartung’s auxiliary police unit perpetrated, it is possible to 
establish a typical series of events.133  From the train station in Berezovka, the Romanian 
gendarmerie forced columns of emaciated and diseased Jews, most of whom were old 
men, women, and children, to march in circles for days in order to increase the death toll 
before arriving at detention camps near the region’s ethnic German villages.134  In the 
dead of winter and without any food or water, these conditions were deathtraps explicitly 
designed to kill as many Jews as possible.  While their victims suffered, Hartung 
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 assembled his command’s policemen at the local police station either on the day of the 
massacre or a few days prior to the killing.135  Given that the typical execution squad of 
fifty policemen required both the active as well as the reserve unit of the auxiliary police, 
and given the probable lack of telephone communications, the Regional Commander 
frequently had to wait anywhere from a few hours to a few days to assemble the 
necessary personnel.136   After issuing the auxiliary policemen rifles and ammunition 
from the armory, Hartung or his German subordinates led the policemen out of town to 
the execution site.  Upon reaching the countryside immediately outside of town, Hartung, 
who reportedly spoke fluent Russian, ordered the victims to strip to their underwear and 
to hand over all of their valuables.137  Having collected their victims’ belongings, the 
policemen shot the Jews and incinerated their bodies. 
As one ethnic German auxiliary policeman detailed this process during a 1957 KGB 
interrogation: 
In the second half of January 1942, I was ordered by the village commander, 
along with other individuals—namely local residents of German nationality—to 
report to the barracks.  We were told that, along with policemen from the main 
unit of the militia, we were not to allow any unknown persons into our village and 
that we would need to kill the Jews who were to be brought to our village.  A few 
days after the start of our stay in the barracks, two assistants from the 
commandant’s office . . . (perhaps it was only one of the two) arrived, handed us 
10 to 15 cartridges [a piece] and ordered those of us in the barracks out and onto 
the street to the edge of the forest in the direction of Berezovka. . . .  As we 
arrived at the edge of the forest we saw a column of slow moving Jews, mainly 
women with a few old men and children.  The aforementioned people were going 
parallel to the edge of the forest.  . . .  On order of the commander, these 
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 policemen and us—those who had come from the barracks—opened fire on the 
Jews.  By early evening, everything with these approximately 200 to 300 Jews 
was finished and we headed home. . . . I heard that the corpses of the Jews who 
were shot were piled up and burned.  The village elder [Dorfstarosta] . . . had the 
local leading residents gather the corpses and set them alight.138
 
While all of the murders perpetrated by Rastadt’s ethnic German auxiliary police 
followed this basic pattern, preliminary evidence indicates that both the scale and the 
efficiency of the killings increased over the course of the winter.  Whereas in December 
1941 the Rastadt unit murdered smaller groups of thirty to fifty Jews per massacre, by 
January 1942, the number of Jews murdered in each massacre increased as much as five 
fold.139  Although this jump coincides with larger Romanian deportations in early 1942, it 
also indicates that the same number of men became more efficient killers both in terms of 
killing technique and body disposal.  Despite the fact that in earlier massacres ethnic 
German policemen testified that they shot randomly into a large group of Jews, in 
subsequent mass murders the policemen killed small groups of Jews using a Genickschuß, 
a single shot to the base of the skull delivered at a distance of three to four meters.140  As 
the Einsatzgruppen had learned earlier, this method of killing was both more accurate and 
consumed less ammunition. 
Rastadt’s auxiliary policemen also made similar advancements in terms of body 
disposal.  Contrary to early massacres in which the auxiliary policemen or their Russian 
helpers had to transport their victims to pits for cremation, the perpetrators later simply 
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 shot their victims at the edge of preexisting pits and allowed the corpses to fall in before 
dousing them with gasoline and setting them on fire.141  Prior to the war, the area’s 
Volksdeutschen had used a “cadaver dump,” which was located on the edge of a hill 
approximately three kilometers from Rastadt, to dispose of the corpses of game and farm 
animals.  Approximately five to six meters wide and roughly six to eight meters deep, 
this preexisting trench appears to have been a choice dual execution and incineration 
location for Rastadt’s Volksdeutsche police unit.142  Alternatively, Special Command 
Russia also employed limekilns, which were ubiquitous in the Transnistria as a means of 
producing quicklime, as a way to cremate their victims efficiently.143  Notwithstanding 
the increased speed with which Special Command Russia could murder its victims, this 
grisly innovation had one notable disadvantage.  As the Rastadt auxiliary police cremated 
its victims’ bodies, the stench of burning flesh and hair wafted into the neighboring 
ethnic German settlement and ensured that no one in the surrounding communities was 
ignorant of the massacres.144
In Rastadt, as in other villages, one important motivation for both the SS commanders 
and for the Volksdeutsche auxiliary policemen was simple robbery.  Although the 
Volksdeutschen were the recipients of much of the booty of these killings, it appears that 
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 the most valuable items found their way into the pockets of Special Command Russia’s 
German officers.  According to postwar testimony, Hartung kept the equivalent of three 
to four wheelbarrows full of bracelets and pocket watches in his command post office.145  
Not to be outdone by their German superiors, Volksdeutsche auxiliary policemen 
sometimes took the initiative and appropriated the spoils of murder for themselves.  For 
example, in December 1941, an auxiliary policeman from Rastadt arrested a Jew who 
attempted to enter an ethnic German settlement to barter his boots away for some food.  
Rather than to trade for the boots, the Volksdeutscher led the Jew outside of town and 
shot him in order to steal his footwear.146  In addition, local Russians, who appear to have 
assisted voluntarily the auxiliary police in incinerating the corpses, were likely motivated 
by the potential for material gain.147  Furthermore, it appears that the most common type 
of booty for the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans was clothing taken from Jewish victims 
prior to murder.148  Given that German authorities predicated these killings in large 
measure as a way to contain typhus, which is spread by lice that infest garments, these 
murders ironically increased the risk of infection for the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen.  
The greed of Special Command Russia and its ethnic German accomplices not only 
negated the original justification for their crimes, but also produced precisely what Nazi 
officials claimed to be trying to prevent. 
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  Although the crimes of the Rastadt auxiliary police highlight the basic pattern that all 
of Special Command Russia’s massacres followed, two additional features must be noted.  
First, although these types of massacres occurred throughout the Transnistria’s ethnic 
German settlements, they appear to have been concentrated in certain areas.  For example, 
based on West German interrogations, the area around the Volksdeutsche village of 
Mannheim was the scene of multiple massacres, whereas the area around Neudorf was 
relatively quiet.149  While it is possible that witnesses and defendants successfully 
deceived postwar investigators, it appears equally likely that these murders occurred 
around the specific locations to which the Romanian gendarmerie drove its Jewish 
captives.  Second, some Regional Commanders seem to have regarded ethnic German 
participation in these murders as a crucial initiation ritual.  After a massacre to the west 
of Lichtenfeld in February 1942, for example, the SS-man and the local ethnic German 
commander overseeing the killing ordered the area’s Volksdeutsche policemen to parade 
past the corpse-filled ditch to sanctify it as a “swearing-in location.”  As this instance 
illustrates, some local SS commanders placed great emphasis on ethnic German 
participation in these murders, and declared it to be a matter of “honor.”150
 While Special Command Russia’s ethnic German auxiliary police shared many 
similarities with other perpetrator cohorts, it is important to note that, unlike the itinerant 
killers of the Einsatzgruppen or the Order Police, Special Command Russia’s auxiliary 
policemen had to fit their crimes within their everyday frame of reference.  This process 
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 occurred on two levels.  First, unlike many German perpetrators who committed their 
crimes in distant Eastern Europe hundreds of miles from their homes, the Transnistria’s 
Volksdeutschen perpetrators murdered their victims directly outside of their villages, and 
well within their preexisting geographic and linguistic frameworks.  Second, in contrast 
to German perpetrators who murdered their victims at chronologically-discrete times, 
namely while stationed with their units, Special Command Russia’s auxiliary policemen 
had to incorporate their crimes into their everyday existence.  As part-time killers, the 
Transnistria’s ethnic German murderers were only away from their homes for at most a 
few days and oftentimes returned to their families immediately after murdering.  Rather 
than murder as a unique métier or as “work” distinctly separate from personal life that 
some scholars highlight, these auxiliary policemen had to integrate absolutely grisly 
crimes into the cycle of their normal lives in a way that most German perpetrators did 
not.151  Therefore, while the crimes of the Volksdeutsche auxiliary police were ostensibly 
similar to those of German perpetrators, both their geographical and their personal 
proximity to their killing actions distinguish them from other perpetrator cohorts. 
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CHAPTER III 
CREATING PERPETRATORS: SS POLICY AND THE TRANSNISTRIA’S 
ETHNIC GERMANS 
 
Creating the New Nazi Order 
 To understand the unique context created by SS policy in the Transnistria, it is 
necessary to trace the contours of German rule from the very arrival of German forces.  
In the late summer of 1941 the rapid advance of German and Romanian forces, as well as 
the chaotic retreat of the Red Army, yielded huge territorial gains for the invading forces.  
Between early and mid-August 1941, forward elements of the German Army occupied 
the Volksdeutschen communities northeast of Odessa.152  During the Romanian-German 
advance, approximately one-third of all ethnic German villages were destroyed in the 
course of battle.153  After routing Soviet forces, the German military’s immediate concern 
was to protect the area’s ethnic Germans from remaining communists and the retreating 
Red Army.154  By the order of the German Eleventh Army’s commander, Colonel 
General von Schobert, occupying forces were to treat all crimes against the area’s ethnic 
Germans as capital offences, and every Volksdeutsche house received a placard 
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 indicating its inhabitants’ ethnicity.155  Within days of the initial occupation, the German 
Army stationed a company of the elite “Brandenburg” Regiment, which had recently 
rotated out of frontline duty due to casualties, to provide security for the area’s ethnic 
Germans.156  In order to guard against potential plundering by Romanian units, the 
German Army also established nascent ethnic German self-defense units.157  While the 
reports that the German military submitted to Berlin concerning the political orientation 
of the area’s ethnic Germans varied, they almost unanimously decried the poor physical 
condition of the area’s Volksdeutschen.158
Although the German military controlled the Kutschurgan enclave for only a relatively 
short period of time, it initiated the region’s Nazification by simultaneously providing 
material aid to the area’s politically and racially desirable majority as well as assisting in 
the murder of a suspect minority.  For example, the Wehrmacht’s medical staff 
immediately began treating Volksdeutsche patients and distributing victuals to needy 
ethnic Germans.159  In Kandel, this concern for Volksdeutsche health and welfare even 
prompted army physicians to instruct nursing ethnic German mothers in modern feeding 
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 techniques.160  Likewise, the Brandenburg regiment rewrote the local ethnic German 
school curriculum and sent away for appropriate teaching materials from Württemberg-
Hohenzollern, which arrived at the beginning of October 1941.161  As would become a 
pattern throughout the duration of the German occupation, these material benefits came 
with an explicit political agenda.  On August 24 in the town of Baden, the local 
Volksdeutschen opened a town meeting with the stiff-armed Nazi salute and declaration 
of “Heil Hitler” a mere eleven days after the arrival of German forces.162  For a 
population in which many had never seen Hitler’s picture, this startling change in visible 
political behavior is all the more impressive.163
Within a matter of days of the initial German occupation, the advanced guard of 
Einsatzgruppe D arrived to further the bloody process of converting disparate ethnic 
German settlements into colonial outposts of Nazi Germany’s planned empire in the 
East.164  In August and September 1941, for example, Einsatzkommando 12 of 
Einsatzgruppe D began classifying the local population and murdering “undesirable” 
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 elements in Speyer, a Volksdeutsche settlement approximately fifty kilometers northwest 
of Nikolaev.165  As with the vast majority of Einsatzgruppe missions, the eight SS-
officers in Speyer focused on annihilating the region’s Jews.166  In order to collect the 
hundreds of Jews in the surrounding area who had fled the initial German advance, 
Einsatzkommando 12 used hastily organized ethnic German auxiliary forces to transport 
its victims. 167  According to one ethnic German from Katharinenthal, a Volksdeutsche 
village less than five kilometers to the east of Speyer, shortly after the arrival of the 
Einsatzkommando, he and nine other local ethnic Germans received orders to report to 
Speyer.  Speyer’s local German commander informed him and his compatriots that they 
were to deliver any Jews that they found to the SD.  Using this protean ethnic German 
auxiliary force, over the coming weeks Einsatzkommando 12 murdered the area’s entire 
Jewish population in an outlying cemetery and at the edge of a nearby anti-tank ditch. 168
 One can best describe the initial reactions of the local ethnic Germans to the 
Einsatzgruppe as ambivalent.  While there does not appear to be any evidence of direct 
ethnic German participation in the shootings, their assistance was crucial to the success of 
the mission.  First, lacking the biographical information necessary to select victims, the 
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 leaders of the Einsatzkommando turned to the local village’s ethnic German mayor, who 
helped the unit choose its targets.  Second, although further research is necessary, at least 
some ethnic German residents assisted in guarding the victims during the march to the 
two execution sites that Einsatzkommando 12 employed, and then in burying the bodies.  
Third, as had become increasingly common, the local Volksdeutschen were the material 
beneficiaries of the massacre in that the Einsatzkommando distributed the property of the 
recently murdered Jews to area ethnic Germans.169  That said, the support of the ethnic 
German community was by no means universal.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that ethnic 
Germans individually opposed the actions of the Einsatzkommando and even hid Jews 
from their would-be murderers.170  Thus, it appears that an active Volksdeutsche minority 
in and around Speyer assisted the Einsatzkommando in its bloody mission, whereas an 
ethnic German majority tepidly acceded to the murder of the local Jewish community.171
In discussing the bloody campaign of the Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union and 
particularly in the Transnistria, it is important to remember that, in addition to murdering 
communists, Jews, and partisans, Einsatzgruppen were also responsible for eliminating 
racial and political enemies within ethnic German communities.  Once they had racially 
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 and politically “purified” these Volksdeutschen settlements, Einsatzgruppe D, like the 
German Army, attempted to provide temporary relief to surviving ethnic Germans and to 
begin mobilizing them for Nazi Germany’s “war for race and space.”172  In Speyer, as in 
numerous other settlements, this “decontamination” took on the form of murdering local 
ethnic Germans whom their neighbors denounced as communists.  One Volksdeutscher 
auxiliary, who assisted the Einsatzkommando in Speyer, explicitly remembered burying 
the bodies of ethnic Germans who had allegedly assisted Soviet authorities in deporting 
other members of the community.173  In Worms members of the Einsatzgruppe murdered 
six Volksdeutschen in addition to more than a dozen local Jews at the nearby airfield.  
According to the denunciations of local Volksdeutsche, these communists purportedly 
had collaborated with Soviet officials in deporting members of their community to 
Siberia during the 1930s.  In Lichtenfeld, located approximately eighty-five kilometers 
northwest of Nikolaev, local ethnic Germans explicitly denounced local Volksdeutsche 
communists as retribution for supposedly denouncing members of the community to 
Soviet officials in 1936.  Members of the responsible SD (Sicherheitsdienst) unit quickly 
murdered both alleged communists, the erstwhile ethnic German mayor of Lichtenfeld 
and his close friend, the local Jewish schoolteacher.174  As was Einsatzgruppe D’s modus 
operandi in the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen communities during the late summer of 
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 1941, German officials used information provided by local Volksdeutschen to identify 
and to murder individuals—Jews as well as other ethnic Germans—whom they deemed 
to be the regime’s racial and political enemies.175
In targeting its victims, Einsatzgruppe D depended not only on denunciation from local 
ethnic Germans, but also on the complicity of the German Army.  For example, on 
August 17, 1941, the Volksdeutsche residents of Selz denounced Peter Schumsky to the 
German Army’s Secret Field Police (Geheime Feldpolizei).176  Schumsky, whom 
German officials identified as an ethnic German, allegedly had assisted Soviet authorities 
in deporting thirteen villagers across the Bug River to Nikolaev prior to the arrival of 
German forces.  During his interrogation the following day, the Secret Field Police 
learned that not only was Schumsky married to a Russian, but also that he had joined the 
Communist Party five months earlier.  After declaring him guilty of assisting Soviet 
authorities, the Secret Field Police turned Schumsky over to the SD Sonderkommando 
10a, which executed him two days after his initial arrest. 177  This episode illustrates not 
only the complicity of both local Volksdeutsche and the German Army in Einsatzgruppe 
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 D’s efforts to bring Nazi Germany’s new racial order to the Transnistria, but also the 
speed with which the region’s new rulers murdered some ethnic Germans.178
 Given the importance of denunciations in each of these episodes, it is useful to contrast 
briefly the specific circumstances that surrounded denunciation in the Transnistria with 
those in Germany.  Over the past decade and a half, studies by Robert Gellatley, Eric 
Johnson, and others have illustrated the importance of denunciations to the Gestapo’s 
effectiveness in Germany.179  Although the centrality of denunciation to Einsatzgruppe 
D’s murderous mission in the Transnistria adds an interesting dimension to this 
scholarship, it is important to note that both organizations responded differently to 
denunciations.  Whereas after a denunciation the Gestapo in Germany could launch an 
investigation into the merits of the claim, such a luxury was not possible for 
Einsatzgruppe D in the Transnistria.  While further study of the pattern of ethnic German 
denunciations in the Transnistria is necessary, like denunciations to the Gestapo in 
Germany, the example of Lichtenfeld illustrates that personal animosity was a source of 
denunciation.180  Despite the fact that the Gestapo in Germany was both aware of this 
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 problem and often capable of distinguishing between these types of complaints, their 
colleagues stationed in the Transnistria during the late summer of 1941 had no such 
capacity.181  Lacking both the language skills and an intimate knowledge of the area, 
members of Einsatzgruppe D depended upon sympathetic local Volksdeutsche as cultural 
and linguistic intermediaries—precisely the individuals who denounced their neighbors 
as Jews and communists.  Second, with the exception of crimes committed at the twilight 
of Nazi rule, the Gestapo in Germany rarely carried out public summary executions.  By 
contrast, Einsatzgruppe D’s explicit purpose was to sort and murder the regime’s racial 
and political enemies soon after the German invasion of the Soviet Union.  Therefore, 
unlike the Gestapo in Germany, Einsatzgruppen personnel in the Transnistria largely 
accepted uncritically ethnic German denunciations and murdered the alleged offenders 
almost immediately.  In doing so, Einsatzgruppe D’s genocidal activities established the 
foundations for the brutal and arbitrary nature of German rule in the Transnistria’s 
Volksdeutschen settlements. 
 
The Transnistria’s New Nazi Order 
 Prior to examining the policies that Special Command Russia implemented during the 
German occupation, it is useful to probe briefly the biographies of the unit’s SS officers.  
To execute these lofty plans, Lorenz chose two of the most ideologically committed and 
zealous SS-officers in the Ethnic German Liaison Office—SS-Brigadier General 
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 (Brigadeführer) Horst Hoffmeyer and his assistant SS-Lieutenant Colonel 
(Obersturmbannführer) Dr. Klaus Siebert.  A Volksdeutscher originally from Posen, 
Hoffmeyer served in the Freikorps during the interwar period and later joined the SS.  
Early in his SS career Hoffmeyer performed unknown “special services” for the Nazi 
Party so sensitive that they went unlisted in his secret personnel file.  Hoffmeyer likewise 
participated in the Polish campaign by working undercover in Poland prior to September 
1939.  A member of the Ethnic German Liaison Office since at least early 1939, 
Hoffmeyer’s murky past and access to sensitive information has led scholars like Lumans 
to speculate that he was a secret member of the SS’s intelligence service, the SD.  During 
the Ethnic German Liaison Office’s resettlement programs between 1939 and 1941, 
Hoffmeyer was ubiquitous, first overseeing the transportation of Baltic ethnic Germans 
from Riga, then working in Poland, and finally flying to Moscow with the German 
delegation to negotiate the resettlement of Volksdeutschen from Bessarabia.  Lumans 
aptly concludes that, as the Ethnic German Liaison Office’s primary troubleshooter, 
Hoffmeyer was one of its most vigorous and dedicated officers.182
 Similarly, Klaus Siebert, an overt member of the SD, provides “a fascinating glimpse 
into the background of an energetic, fanatical, career SS man.”183  Born January 25, 1903, 
near Zalle, Siebert studied at the Universities of Königsberg and Breslau during the 1920s.  
An engineer by profession, Siebert joined the Nazi Party in 1932 and the SS in 1935.   In 
1935, Siebert also began work at a precursor organization to the infamous Reich Security 
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 Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) and joined the Ethnic German Liaison Office in 
November 1939.184  There he served with distinction, receiving the War Service Cross, 
Second Class with Swords in 1943.185  As Hoffmeyer’s May 1944 evaluation of Siebert 
indicates, the latter also had extensive experience in ethnic German resettlement actions 
in Soviet-occupied Poland, the General Government, and Bessarabia.186  Put simply, 
Lorenz selected two of his most qualified, ideologically committed officers to prepare 
this long-sought-after population for Nazi Germany’s race war in the East. 
This same type of ideological zeal was also reflected in Special Command Russia’s 
mid-ranking officers.  Although additional research into the individual Regional 
Commands is necessary, one clear feature is the prominence of ethnic Germans as 
Regional Commanders and as members of the Regional Command staff.187  The Regional 
Commander of Hoffnungsthal, for example, was a Romanian ethnic German from 
Bessarabia.188  His command of Romanian made him an invaluable participant in Special 
Command Russia’s interactions with the Transnistria’s Romanian rulers.  In the captain’s 
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 SS personnel file, his superiors lauded him as “one of the most diligent men in our ranks, 
highly valued as a person, an SS-man, and a comrade.”189  This sterling recommendation, 
which was part of a broader effort to obtain an estate for him in West Prussia, was no 
doubt due to his political convictions.  As a National Socialist who worked in Romania 
until 1932, he eventually immigrated to Germany and, as a reward for his support, 
Himmler elevated him to the rank of captain in the SS.  Thus, like Hoffmeyer and Siebert, 
the numerous mid-level ethnic Germans who staffed Special Command Russia in the 
Transnistria were ideologically-driven Nazis.190
 In addition to their general political orientation, the Manichean racial and political 
territory that the Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche inhabited in the eyes of Special Command 
Russia’s officers was a product of the SS’s broader policy toward Soviet ethnic Germans. 
Notwithstanding Nazi rhetoric of the Volksdeutschen as the racial seeds for German 
domination in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union’s ethnic Germans remained a politically 
and racially suspect population.191  Less than two months after the invasion of the Soviet 
Union, the office of the Reichsführer-SS issued orders for the formation of indigenous 
auxiliary forces in occupied Soviet territory.  These directives explicitly forbade calling 
up any “so-called ethnic Germans” who had had the opportunity to immigrate to 
Germany prior to the war, but yet chose to remain on Soviet soil.  For these ethnic 
Germans, who “did not follow the call of the Führer,” the SS had “a different treatment” 
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 in mind.192  Although these grim regulations did not apply specifically to the 
Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche population, for whom immigration prior to the war was 
generally not possible, they do offer insight into the mindset of German occupation 
officials.  For the SS, the Soviet Union’s ethnic Germans were thus either the new order’s 
active supporters or its enemies.193
 Following Einsatzgruppe D’s ephemeral presence in the Transnistria, Special 
Command Russia, which was responsible for establishing permanent rule over the area’s 
ethnic Germans, expanded and intensified the twofold mission of ensuring Volksdeutsche 
welfare as well as their political and racial “purity.”194  One of Special Command 
Russia’s initial tasks was providing economic aid, which local Volksdeutsche desperately 
needed after decades of Stalin’s rule.  Caring for an estimated 130,000 ethnic Germans 
spread across Odessa and the 230 disparate settlements in the Transnistria was one of 
Special Command Russia’s most pressing challenges.195  As mentioned above, in an area 
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 ravaged first by collectivization, famine, and deportation, and then by the violence of the 
opening weeks of the Second World War, German planners appreciated the threat to the 
biological building blocks of the new Aryan order in the East.  As well as redistributing 
the property of murdered Jews and communists to ethnic Germans, Special Command 
Russia assigned the best collective farmland to Volksdeutschen and equipped them with 
salvaged equipment from erstwhile Machine Tractor Stations.196  Special Command 
Russia likewise returned land to ethnic Germans that Soviet authorities had expropriated 
during collectivization.197  In addition to encouraging German firms to build factories in 
the Transnistria, Special Command Russia even toyed with the idea of relocating a textile 
plant from Belgium to the Transnistria to develop the region industrially.198  By July 
1942 Hoffmeyer could proudly announce to Alexianu, that he had secured agreements 
with the German firms Bremer Handelsgesellschaft für Transnistrien, Bernhard Küpker 
und Co., Hansing Philippi, G.m.b.H., Wedanko, and Andreae Noris Zahn, A.G. to begin 
operating in the Transnistria’s ethnic German settlements.199
 Given the exigencies of the Second World War, Special Command Russia attempted to 
establish an impressive social infrastructure for the Volksdeutschen of the Transnistria.  
Its 214 schools—nearly one per village—accommodated the region’s more than 22,000 
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 students.  Special Command Russia also operated eighteen kindergartens for the area’s 
some 1,200 ethnic German youngsters and founded a teacher-training institute to provide 
for the 648 instructors.  Furthermore, Special Command Russia took particular care with 
medical provisions for its ethnic German charges.  It maintained seven hospitals, nineteen 
ambulances, a pharmacy and thirteen doctors, nine of whom were ethnic Germans.  
Special Command Russia likewise established ninety-two special stores that were open 
exclusively to German or Volksdeutsche customers.200  In many cases, Special Command 
Russia also distributed rations directly to ethnic Germans, and specifically much-sought-
after staples like cigarettes, matches, sugar, salt, and distilled alcohol.201  The 
Transnistria’s SS commanders even provided for the entertainment needs of the local 
Volksdeutschen by organizing film evenings.202  In addition, Special Command Russia 
printed its own newspaper entitled Der Deutsche in Transnistrien (The German in 
Transnistria).203  Although the war prevented German authorities from implementing 
their plans fully, the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans tasted briefly the fruits of Nazi 
Germany’s racially-defined welfare utopia. 
Not surprisingly, the Transnistria’s Nazi masters established social services for the 
region’s ethnic German communities with a clear political agenda.  For example, Special 
Command Russia worked assiduously to provide appropriate spiritual guidance for the 
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 region’s ethnic Germans.  Despite the fact that Dr. Georg Leibbrandt of the Ministry for 
the Occupied Eastern Territories banned civilian German clergy from entering the 
Reich’s new Eastern European empire in keeping with a September 1941 Reich 
Chancellery order, the Transnistria, which did not fall under his purview, was not subject 
to these restrictions.204  As was the case with so many of Special Command Russia’s later 
initiatives, the German military began the area’s religious renaissance.  Wehrmacht 
clergy, such as Pastor H. Roemmich, who returned to his home village of Worms and 
officiated as the local Lutheran minister until his unit continued its advance eastward, 
first helped to rebuild the area’s religious establishment.205  Special Command Russia’s 
success in this avenue of reconstruction was initially more limited.  Based on 
Hoffmeyer’s correspondence with Alexianu in March 1942, it appears that Special 
Command Russia had great difficulty in recruiting priests committed to building “an 
orderly Catholic church structure” in the area.206  Hoffmeyer’s luck in attracting Lutheran 
pastors appears to have been better.  Three months later, in June 1942, Hoffmeyer touted 
an agreement with the German Lutheran bishop in Romania, Wilhelm Staedel, who 
agreed to provide Special Command Russia with four ethnic German pastors destined for 
Volksdeutsche congregations in Odessa, Johannistal, Lichtenfeld, and Helenental.207  
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 Given that Staedel was a leading figure in the German Christian movement 
(Glaubensbewegung “Deutsche Christen”), an organization that sought to meld National 
Socialism and völkish racism with Protestant Christianity, it is likely that Hoffmeyer 
sought to arrange politically appropriate spiritual guidance for his flock.208
Along with the litany of achievements that Special Command Russia boasted, it 
likewise listed four “German Houses” (Deutsche Häuser), which were cultural 
institutions, designed explicitly to disseminate Nazi propaganda.209  Hoffmeyer’s office 
was, in fact, so proud of its German Houses that it extended Alexianu an invitation to 
attend the June 14, 1942, opening of its newest facility in Odessa.210  German officials 
likewise established ethnic German National Socialist organizations that mirrored the 
functions of their German counterparts.  For example, Special Command Russia 
attempted to replicate the Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend) as the German Youth (Deutsche 
Jugend), the Labor Front (Arbeitsfront) as the German Workforce (Deutsche 
Arbeiterschaft), and in place of the SA (Sturmabteilung) the German Squad (Deutsche 
Mannschaft).211
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 Special Command Russia’s ideological agenda is perhaps nowhere more obvious than 
in the educational materials that it used in its ethnic German schools.212  In addition to 
requisitioning pens, pencils, and paper, Special Command Russia also ordered 2,200 
copies of Mein Kampf and 200 copies of Alfred Rosenberg’s Parteiprogramm (Party 
Program) as general instruction materials.  Likewise, for biology class, Special Command 
Russia obtained 1,000 copies of Stämmler’s Volk und Rasse (People and Race).213  Thus 
the SS’s narrow racial ideology defined both the form of the Transnistria’s Nazi welfare 
system and its beneficiaries. 
 In order to identify the proper racial recipients of the Nazi welfare state, Special 
Command Russia conducted a massive process of ethnic classification and registered the 
Volksdeutschen for ration cards.214  With the failure of traditional markers of ethnicity 
like language to separate the racially damned from Hitler’s chosen people, German 
government and Nazi party offices, like Special Command Russia, turned to a familiar 
and more readily measurable indicator—participation in Germany’s genocidal 
projects.215  Originally created in 1941 to rank West Prussia’s Volksdeutsche population, 
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 but later expanded to include all German-occupied territories, the classification categories 
for the People’s Census (Volksliste) laid the foundations for the bio-political sorting of all 
ethnic Germans.216  Thus, following the guidelines provided by the Immigration Central 
Office (Einwandererzentralstelle) of the Ethnic German Liaison Office, Special 
Command Russia attempted to establish the degree to which the Transnistria’s ethnic 
Germans “had held on to their Germandom.”217  Based on the definition that Special 
Command Russia employed, a third-class Volksdeutscher was an individual who was not 
of pure German ancestry and was married to a non-German.  A second-class ethnic 
German was someone who, although a full-blooded German, was married to a non-
German.218  In order to be included as a true member of the Volksgemeinschaft—and thus 
as a first category Volksdeutscher—an ethnic German and his or her spouse needed to 
have had at least three German grandparents.219  More importantly, he or she needed to 
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 “have had participated actively in the racial struggle for the future territories.”220  In other 
words, one way for a Volksdeutscher to become a true German was if he or she murdered 
Nazi Germany’s racial and political enemies.221
 These classifications, which one Special Command Russia officer later described 
understatedly as “not completely schematically implemented,” had important and even 
life-threatening implications for the Transnistria’s ethnic German population.222  For 
example, Himmler, in his capacity as Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of 
Germandom, severely limited the property rights of third-class ethnic Germans.223  
Similarly, an auxiliary policeman from the Transnistria’s Neu-Amerika settlement 
recounted that because he lived with a Russian woman and spoke poor German, German 
officials did not classify him as a full-blooded German.  As a result, his superiors 
assigned him particularly undesirable patrol duties.224  In addition, Volksdeutsche 
identity papers endowed the holder with the ability to travel outside of his or her home 
area.225  More importantly, as a former Special Command Russia officer concluded, “the 
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 possession of a German identification card brought with it advantages because the [ethnic] 
Germans were better taken care of than the other ethnic groups.”226  Given that German 
policy starved Ukraine’s population during the occupation, Special Command Russia’s 
regular shipments of food and access to exclusive German-only stores saved the 
Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen from malnutrition.227
This system, however, was often abused by non-Germans who illegally obtained either 
the green identification card of class one or two ethnic Germans or the blue identification 
cards of third-class Volksdeutsche.228  In fact, one Volksdeutscher in Odessa complained 
to occupation authorities that “in our city there are still many Jews with German or 
Russian passports and with passports of other countries.”229  By dint of these types of 
complaints, Special Command Russia took a keen interest in ensuring that ethnic German 
identity papers did not fall into the wrong hands.  In the Lichtenfeld Regional Command, 
for example, the illegal transfer of identity papers turned deadly when a local ethnic 
German drunkard sold his documents to a Russian in order to purchase more alcohol.  
Because of this transgression, in mid-1942, the local Regional Commander ordered his 
execution.230  Put simply, an ethnic German’s identity papers were his or her ticket to life 
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 rather than death—a matter so serious that German officials were willing to murder some 
members of the “master race” to ensure that their papers remained in the proper hands. 
 Despite Nazi rhetoric of the Volksdeutschen as the racial seeds for German domination 
in Eastern Europe, the Transnistria’s ethnic Germans remained a politically and a racially 
suspect population.  According to Soviet and West German postwar testimony, 
throughout the duration of Special Command Russia’s control of the Transnistria, 
German officials labeled recalcitrant and hostile ethnic Germans as communists and 
murdered them throughout the region’s ethnic German settlements.  For example, when 
an ethnic German Wehrmacht interpreter returned to his hometown of Neudorf on a 
multi-week leave in October 1942, he discovered that his mother’s twin brother, the 
former Soviet mayor of the village, was under arrest in the Regional Commander’s 
office.231  When, at his mother’s urging, the interpreter approached the Regional 
Commander, the former learned that the auxiliary police planned to execute his uncle for 
deporting some of the village’s Volksdeutschen between 1933 and 1937.  A few days 
later, members of the auxiliary police led the interpreter’s uncle to a vegetable garden 
half a kilometer outside of Neudorf and shot him along with two other prisoners.232  In 
Selz, the auxiliary police began to suspect the former ethnic German mayor of having 
assisted the NKVD in deporting ethnic Germans during the 1930s.  One day at lunchtime, 
the local Regional Commander stopped the suspect and ordered him into an armored car 
under the pretense that he had been instructed to relocate.  A week later, villagers found 
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 his body in a nearby field, his face so mangled that his wife could only recognize him by 
the clothes that he was wearing.233  Given the small size of these predominantly 
ethnically homogenous villages—Selz, for example, had only three to four thousand 
residents—it is doubtful that German authorities could have concealed these murders 
from other ethnic German inhabitants even had they wanted to do so.234  The killings at 
Neudorf and Selz were, furthermore, not isolated.  Rather, they illustrate a broader 
pattern of very public violence that Special Command Russia launched against the 
Transnistria’s ethnic Germans.235
 
Ethnic Germans and Jews 
Given that scholars writing on Eastern European ethnic Germans often assert that the 
latter’s level of anti-Semitism was much higher than that of Reich Germans, it is useful to 
consider its importance in framing the overall context in which ethnic Germans chose to 
                                                 
233 Barch, B 162/2315/328. 
234 Barch, B 162/2315/321. 
235 Barch, B 162/2297/109.  For example, similar incidents occurred in Alexanderfeld, Mannheim, and 
Rosenfeld.  Barch, B 162/2315/275, 304-9.  Similarly, late one night in December 1941, the local auxiliary 
police arrested the former Soviet ethnic German manager of the mill in Worms.  Less than two weeks later, 
the local auxiliary police shot him at the edge of the Worms airstrip. Barch, B 162/2313/160.  Likewise, in 
Hochfeld, the auxiliary police shot an ethnic German for shirking his military service.  Barch, B 
162/2315/225.  Himmler required that Volksdeutsche listed in the first three categories of the People’s 
Census perform compulsory military service.  “Der Oberpräsident der Provinz Oberschlesien / Kattowitz, 
den 23. März 1942 / An die / Gauleitung der NSDAP” T74/14/385753.  One should also note that Jews and 
ethnic Germans were not Special Command Russia’s only victims.  Under the guise of anti-partisan 
activities, Russians and Ukrainians were one prominent group of German victims.  Barch, B 162/2315/142, 
172-3, 305.  Similarly, in the Lichtenfeld regional command, Special Command Russia also targeted 
gypsies.  Barch, B 162/2315/220. 
 72
 become killers.236  Although the observations that many scholars make about ethnic 
German anti-Semitism may apply to the Volksdeutschen in general, the impressionistic 
basis for these findings calls for a careful examination of ethnic German anti-Semitism in 
the Transnistria.  Like their Ukrainian neighbors, the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen 
existed within a centuries-old heated, and periodically violent, anti-Semitic milieu.237  In 
its more recent manifestation, one common gentile stereotype in Ukraine immediately 
prior to the Second World War was that Jews controlled the Soviet regime—a construct 
that dovetailed with the Nazi struggle against “Jew-Bolshevism.”238  Some ethnic 
Germans unarguably subscribed to these views.  As one rabidly anti-Semitic 
Volksdeutscher complained to German officials in Odessa in early 1942: 
You, my dear German sirs, do not need to say much about the fact that the Jews 
are a dastardly spawn and that they are revengeful.  If only a single Jew were to 
remain in the world, he would take the first opportunity to revenge himself against 
others.  There are still so many of them in Odessa, and they will do everything to 
harm Germans and Romanians and to work for the Bolsheviks.  There are cases in 
which Romanians take bribes from the Jews and release them.  My dear German 
sirs, I ask you to heed my message—it contains the absolute truth.  And therefore 
I ask you to bear down on and help the Romanians . . . cleanse the entire city of 
the Jews.239
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 Although this type of anecdotal evidence indicates that some ethnic Germans were 
violently anti-Semitic, the question nevertheless remains what portion of the 
Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen shared this view. 
Notwithstanding the underlying Eastern European context in which the Transnistria’s 
Volksdeutschen lived, the apparent rate of marriage between ethnic Germans and Jews 
indicates that these violently anti-Semitic views were far from universal.  In their postwar 
interrogations, accused perpetrators repeatedly referred to the difficulty of executing 
Jewish spouses of ethnic Germans and their half-Jewish offspring.  While it is difficult to 
make generalizations based on a handful of anecdotes, the frequency with which 
suspected ethnic German perpetrators recounted the murder of Jewish spouses and 
children of Volksdeutschen indicates how psychologically traumatic ethnic German 
murderers found these killings.240  As other studies of Holocaust perpetrators using 
postwar interrogations illustrate, perpetrators often referred to specific crimes only when 
they felt a particular connection to their victims.241  Moreover, these ubiquitous 
references reflect the reality of the high rate of intermarriage between Jews and ethnic 
Germans in the Kutschurgan enclave of the Transnistria.242  The reasons for this 
unusually high rate of intermarriage—a rate that perhaps dwarfed anything else in the 
former “Pale of Settlement”—were threefold.  First, the Jewish community that lived in 
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 and around Odessa, a cosmopolitan port city since the late eighteenth century, was 
historically highly assimilated and had myriad forms of contact with the region’s 
gentiles.243  Second, the two decades of Soviet economic modernization prior to the 
Second World War brought men and women of disparate ethnic and religious groups into 
contact with one another in a way that would not have been possible a generation earlier 
and accelerated intermarriage.244  Third, the Yiddish-speaking Jews and the 
Volksdeutschen in the Transnistria shared a similar cultural and linguistic heritage.  
During hastily organized deportations, for example, Romanian and even German 
authorities were often unable to distinguish between the two groups.245  Likewise, the 
anonymous Volksdeutsche petitioner estimated that 50 percent of Odessa’s “ethnic 
Germans” were actually Jews.  As the author notes: “the majority of these Jews are able, 
thanks to their German-sounding surnames and accents, to pass as [ethnic] Germans.”246  
Thus, far from being “separated by their ethnic exclusivity and the region's culturally 
based anti-Semitism,” the evidence from postwar judicial records suggests that the 
Volksdeutschen and the Jews of the Transnistria were unusually integrated.247  Both the 
rate of intermarriage between ethnic Germans and Jews, as well as the apparent difficulty 
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 that many ethnic German perpetrators had in murdering Jews who were related to other 
ethnic Germans suggest that Volksdeutsche anti-Semitism in the Transnistria, while 
present, was far from universal. 
 
Nazi Racial Policy and the Mischlinge of the Transnistria 
While the murder of Jewish spouses and half-Jewish children of ethnic Germans does 
not illustrate a unique type of anti-Semitism, these killings do exemplify a uniquely 
violent SS racial policy in the Transnistria that dwarfed anything that the SS was able to 
achieve either in Germany or even in other areas of the occupied Soviet Union.  In order 
to understand the radicalism of this policy, it is important to trace briefly the evolution of 
Nazi Germany’s measures against Jewish spouses of “Aryans” and their Mischlinge 
offspring.  From its very beginnings, Nazi Mischlinge policy was largely a product of 
conflict between German civil servants, who were concerned with the policy’s potentially 
damaging effects on domestic and international opinion, and Nazi Party radicals, who 
sought to expunge all perceived Jewish influence from the body of the German nation.248  
Although the 1935 Nuremberg Laws denaturalized Jews and outlawed marriage and 
sexual relations between Jews and “Aryans,” Hitler was intentionally ambiguous about 
whether or not the laws applied to Mischlinge.249  In the ensuring debate between the 
Nazi Party and the German Interior Ministry, the party’s racial experts advocated treating 
half Jews as Jews, whereas the Ministry proposed that they be regarded as a separate 
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 category.250  In late 1935 Hitler ruled against the Nazi Party’s racial experts and 
concluded that half Jews would only be regarded as Jews if they practiced Judaism or if 
they were married to a Jew.251  Based on the supplemental decrees that accompanied the 
Nuremberg Laws in November 1935, Nazi Germany distinguished between full Jews and 
individuals with one or two Jewish grandparents, second and first degree Mischlinge, 
respectively, who were not practicing Jews.252  Moreover, as highlighted by the 
annotation to each chart explaining the new ordinance in the 1936 Organizationsbuch der 
NSDAP (Organization Book of the NSDAP), that “existing marriages stay untouched,” 
the Nazi Party banned using the Nuremberg regulation, which explicitly forbade mixed 
marriages, on existing unions for fear of public reaction.253
While sensitivity to German public opinion prevented the Nazi Party from expanding 
the legal definition of a Jew in Germany to exempt half Jews, both the Nazi Party and the 
German government had a free hand in the Soviet Union to develop and implement a 
much more radical policy than had been possible inside the Reich’s borders.  Although 
between August and November 1941, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories 
originally intended to use the definition provided by the Nuremberg Laws in the 
conquered Soviet Union, the difficulties of establishing Jewish ancestry in Eastern 
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 Europe quickly became evident.254  At a Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories 
meeting in late October 1941, German officials simply suggested using current religious 
affiliation as a means of identifying Jews.255  From their perspective, Soviet “non-Jews” 
who practiced Judaism “should not be treated in anyway as though they were 
worthwhile.”256  In orders issued by Alfred Rosenberg, the Reichsminister for the 
Occupied Eastern Territories, presumably drafted in late 1941, the ministry articulated a 
compromise whereby all individuals with German or non-Soviet citizenship would be 
treated according to the Nuremberg Laws.257  For Soviet citizens, Rosenberg’s office 
noted, “Jewish Mischlinge of the first degree (half Jews) are understandably just as 
undesirable as full Jews,” and the Ministry placed both into the same racial category.258
Based on the directives that the Reichkommissar für Ostland circulated to his 
Reichskommissariat in November 1941, the changes authorized by Rosenberg had 
important practical implications for Nazi racial policy regarding non-German mixed 
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 marriages in the occupied Soviet Union.  First, unlike in Germany, there were to be no 
privileged gentile-Jewish marriages among the native population—the Jewish spouse was 
often simply expendable.  Second, in the Reichskommissariat Ostland, occupation 
authorities were to make an explicit distinction between gentile-Jewish unions in which 
reproduction could and could not take place.  Thus, if the Jewish partner agreed to 
divorce his or her non-Jewish spouse, the marriage’s half-Jewish children were to be 
treated as non-Jews.259  If, by contrast, the gentile spouse were unwilling to separate from 
his or her Jewish partner, both he or she and the offspring were to be treated as Jews.  
Regardless of whether or not the marriage had produced children, if the non-Jewish 
partner did not agree to separate, he or she was to be considered a Jew.  However, one 
way in which a marriage with a gentile husband could remain intact was if the Jewish 
wife submitted to sterilization.260  Regardless of whether or not this alternative was 
actually feasible on the Eastern Front in the autumn of 1941, the explicit statement of this 
loophole indicates that these guidelines were intended to prevent future partially Jewish 
offspring rather than to eliminate all non-Jewish-Jewish marriages.261  The justification 
for this change in policies was primarily racially-driven.  As Dr. Bernhard Lösener, desk 
officer for racial affairs in the Interior Ministry, stated half-Jews with no German blood 
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 were inherently less racially valuable than half-German Mischlinge.262  Without the 
moderating concerns of domestic public opinion, both the German state and the Nazi 
Party fashioned more radical policies against non-German Mischlinge and mixed 
marriages in the occupied Soviet Union than would have been possible in Germany. 
Thwarted in 1935 by the Interior Ministry, the SS returned to the issue of Mischlinge in 
Germany at the Wannsee Conference in late January 1942.263  In the meeting that was to 
seal the fate of European Jewry, Reinhard Heydrich rearticulated the Party’s stance in 
1935 and proposed that first degree Mischlinge should “in view of the Final Solution be 
equated with Jews.”264  As they had done more than five years earlier, German 
governmental ministers blocked his proposals by arguing that such a policy could lead to 
“a disturbance of the population.”265  Heydrich’s efforts therefore remained stillborn 
because of fears of a potential popular backlash.266  Thus, although the Nazi regime was 
                                                 
262 Barch R / R 6/74 / “Aufzeichnung … über den Verlauf der Besprechung am 29. Januar 1942 im 
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266 Ian Kershaw illustrates the degree to which the Nazi regime tapered its domestic policies in response 
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1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 
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 willing to attack some non-German mixed marriages in the occupied Soviet Union, by 
early 1942 it was unwilling to apply the same guidelines to Germans inside of the Reich’s 
borders. 
As Nazi Party officials and German civil servants compromised over racial policy vis-
à-vis mixed marriages in the Reich and in the German-occupied Soviet Union, Special 
Command Russia pursued an independent racial policy.  Free from the objections of the 
German civil service and concerns over domestic popular opinion, the Transnistria’s SS 
rulers were able to implement a racial policy that was far greater in scope and violence 
than any initiative that the Nazi Party proposed in Germany or in German-occupied 
territory.  For example, in late September 1942, the Volksdeutsche German auxiliary 
police in Rastadt executed hundreds of Jewish forced laborers in the neighboring enclave 
of Neu Amerika only to discover that one of its intended victims was an ethnic German 
woman.  When the SS-officer in charge of the operation met with this seemingly-
misplaced ethnic German woman, she explained that Romanian authorities had arrested 
her husband, a Jewish dentist from Odessa, and because she had been unwilling to 
separate from her spouse, they deported her as well.  The SS-officer then offered to return 
her immediately to Odessa with the caveat that her husband, who was also imprisoned in 
the barn awaiting execution, would have to remain.  When she did not return to the SS 
command post the next morning, the local Volksdeutsche auxiliary police executed the 
couple along with the other Jewish captives.267  Whereas Heydrich never proposed 
murdering the Aryan spouses of Jews, and Rosenberg ordered the killing of only some 
                                                 
267 Barch, B 162/2313/74-6, 88-91. 
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 non-German partners, Special Command Russia executed recalcitrant Volksdeutschen 
who were married to Jews without any apparent restraint if unwilling to separate. 
Special Command Russia furthermore pursued a far more violent policy against the 
region’s half-Jewish children and their ethnic German parents than would have been 
tolerated in either the Reich or in German-occupied territory.  For example, like the 
episode in Worms, the local police offered another ethnic German woman in Selz a 
similar escape.  Although an SD unit that swept the area in the late summer of 1941 
murdered her Jewish husband, she and her half-Jewish children remained untouched until 
after SS authorities established the local Regional Command.  Shortly thereafter members 
of the command post approached the woman and suggested that she distance herself from 
her children.  When the woman refused, she and her children vanished.  According to 
witnesses, the local auxiliary police either shot them outright or deported them to the 
Tiraspol ghetto.268  Similarly, shortly before the arrival of German forces in the summer 
of 1941, the Jewish head of the Worms collective fled with the retreating Red Army.  His 
pregnant Volksdeutsche wife, whom he had left behind, subsequently gave birth.  Shortly 
thereafter, the local SS-commander received word, presumably from other villagers, that 
the child’s father was a Jew.  When the SS-officer found the woman, he snatched the 
child away from her and killed it by smashing its head against the side of her wagon.269  
                                                 
268 Barch, B 162/2315/325. 
269 Barch, B 162/2315/174.  Similarly, in Selz, the auxiliary police arrested and murdered the local 
ethnic German musician’s Jewish wife and two children.  Barch, B 162/2315/325.  Selz appears to have 
been a hotbed of violence against Jewish relations with ethnic Germans.  Barch, B 162/2315/327.  
Similarly, in Bishofsfeld, Romanian soldiers arrested an ethnic German’s wife and their infant son.  The 
Romanians released their prisoners to the local SS commander and the auxiliary police, who shot their 
victims later that day.  Barch, B 162/2315/296-97.   
 82
 Likewise, near the ethnic German settlement of Worms in 1942, the local Volksdeutsche 
auxiliary police unit arrested an ethnic German woman’s Jewish husband who had 
worked in a local collective farm.  A day later, the Worms auxiliary police imprisoned his 
three children.  Within a week his wife found the naked corpses of her husband, her 
infant daughter, and her two stepchildren in an anti-tank ditch outside of town.270  As 
particularly indicated by the murder of ethnic German spouses, this evidence suggests 
that, in contrast to stated occupation policy in the German-occupied Soviet Union, in the 
Transnistria Special Command Russia sought to implement a racial policy that both 
targeted a broader portion of the population and attempted to use familial relations as a 
means of determining political reliability.  Unrestrained by the necessity of having to 
coordinate with civil or military administrators, the Transnistria’s SS rulers were able to 
use the marital relations of ethnic Germans to identify the commitment of ethnic 
Germans to Nazi racial standards, and thus the National Socialist cause with deadly 
consequences.271
                                                 
270 Barch, B 162/2315/174. 
271 Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine, 8. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The crimes of the ethnic German auxiliary police in the Transnistria were a product of 
both a short-term, opportunistic Romanian policy and a long-term SS effort to remake 
radically the fledgling colonies of Hitler’s would-be “Garden of Eden.”272  By deporting 
most of Odessa’s remaining Jews between December 1941 and the end of February 1942, 
the Romanian occupation forces pursued an expulsion policy in direct opposition to 
German plans.  The prospect of thousands of typhus-infected Jews streaming through 
Volksdeutsche settlements into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine terrified German 
occupation officials.  In German eyes, not only were these Jews a potential racial 
contaminant, but, more importantly during the winter of 1941-42, they posed an 
immediate public health hazard to the area’s ethnic Germans.  Romanian policy thus, 
likely intentionally, pressured the Nazi regime to murder the Transnistria’s Jews far 
sooner than it had intended.  As the only available personnel under German command in 
the Transnistria capable of killing on such a scale, the Volksdeutsche auxiliary police 
became an integral part of the Final Solution. 
The reasons why an overwhelming number of ethnic Germans chose to commit murder 
in the winter of 1941-42 were largely a product of the situational factors created by 
Special Command Russia’s policies.  The world the Nazis fashioned in the Transnistria 
was one in which life or death often depended upon the notations of an overworked
                                                 
272 Ibid., 13. 
 
 functionary at the geographic periphery of Germany’s ephemeral empire.  Although for 
more than a generation scholars have noted this brutality against traditionally-recognized 
victim groups such as Jews, historians are only now beginning to recognize that ethnic 
Germans also felt the violent “ripple effects” of the Nazi worldview.273  Whereas other 
non-German perpetrator cohorts provided crucial manpower that Nazi Germany 
desperately needed for the Holocaust, they occupied immutable racial categories in the 
eyes of their Nazi masters.  For example, a Lithuanian auxiliary, no matter how diligently 
he combated the regime’s racial enemies, was not German and thus inferior.  By virtue of 
their malleable position within the Nazi racial hierarchy, ethnic Germans occupied a 
nebulous position that they could help clarify through their own actions.  The Nazi 
regime counted recalcitrant ethnic Germans, like the rest of its victims, as dangerous 
biological and political pathogens that needed to be eradicated from the body of the 
German nation. 
 The Manichaean racial territory that ethnic Germans inhabited—either the regime’s 
chosen children or its biological waste—is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the 
occupied Transnistria under SS administration.  In few other venues could the SS realize 
the Nazi Weltanschauung with so little restraint.  When given the opportunity, the SS 
officers of Special Command Russia drew a sharp distinction between the region’s “true” 
ethnic Germans and those individuals whom, by virtue of not embracing National 
Socialism, they slated for destruction.  Nowhere was this uniquely radical racial policy 
more evident than in Special Command Russia’s eradication of mixed ethnic-German 
                                                 
273 As Bergen aptly concludes, “Jews bore the full brunt of a worldview based on rigid ethnic and racial 
divisions, but the Volksdeutsche experienced some ripple effects of that ruthlessness.”  Bergen, "The 
Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe," 109. 
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 Jewish families.  By contrast, for the chosen heirs of the master race, the SS attempted to 
establish a cradle to grave welfare system.  Equipped with the very best that Germany 
could muster under the exigencies of global war, between 1941 and 1942 the 
Transnistria’s ethnic Germans witnessed the beginnings of a veritable utopia of exclusive 
well-stocked food stores, hospitals, and schools, which contrasted sharply with their 
endangered position under the Soviet regime.  For those ethnic Germans whom SS 
authorities found objectionable, the consequences were equally tangible—almost certain 
death.  From the moment that Nazi officials set foot in the Transnistria as members of 
Einsatzgruppe D in the late summer of 1941 to the collapse of German rule in the spring 
of 1944, the SS and their ethnic German helpers murdered these “race traitors” alongside 
communists, Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs.  Rather than a uniquely violent anti-Semitism, 
Nazi policy shaped the context in which the Volksdeutschen of the Transnistria formed 
their decision to participate in the Holocaust. 
 Furthermore, the underlying milieu that the SS constructed among the Transnistria’s 
ethnic German communities created a situation that differed fundamentally from that of 
Germans living in the Third Reich.  Unlike the “ordinary men” or “ordinary Germans” of 
Reserve Order Police Battalion 101, the Transnistria’s Volksdeutschen lived within a 
context of extremes unmatched by the experiences of their German counterparts.  
Although German perpetrators could receive material benefits for their crimes in the form 
of career advancement or outright corruption, none of these benefits were proportionately 
as impressive as those that the SS presented to the Transnistria’s compliant ethnic 
Germans.  Likewise, although Germans who refused to participate in the Holocaust could 
face stunted careers in the Nazi system or the opprobrium of their peers, there is no 
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 evidence to suggest that any were ever stripped of their “Germanness” and thus placed in 
physical danger for failing to support adequately National Socialism.  By contrast, SS 
officials in the Transnistria routinely shredded the protective cloak of “Germanness” 
from uncooperative Volksdeutsche and exposed them to the regime’s violence.  Although 
further research is necessary, these initial findings raise the tantalizing possibility that 
ethnic Germans could legitimately and perhaps did fear real physical consequences for 
failing to participate in the Holocaust.  At the very least, the intensity, violence, and 
openness with which the SS attempted to “purify” the Transnistria’s ethnic German 
communities constricted the context in which ethnic Germans decided to murder in a way 
that differed fundamentally from that of Germans.  Although the mechanisms that 
scholars have developed to explain perpetrator behavior remain central to understanding 
the Holocaust, the example of the ethnic German perpetrators in the Transnistria calls for 
a reexamination of the Nazi regime’s capacity to cajole and to coerce would-be 
perpetrators to murder its enemies. 
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 APPENDIX 
SOVIET JUDICIAL SOURCES 
 
The preceding examination relies in part upon postwar Soviet investigations of 
suspected Holocaust perpetrators.  Using postwar testimony in examining Holocaust 
perpetrators raises myriad issues about the reliability of the evidence.  Not only do 
interviewees make their statements years after the events, but they often do so within the 
context of criminal investigations.  In such situations, the suspects have little incentive to 
tell the truth.  Although the Central Office for the Investigation of National Socialist 
Violent Crimes and the Dortmund local prosecutor’s office conducted scores of 
independent interviews and interrogations in the Federal Republic of Germany related to 
the Transnistria’s ethnic German auxiliary police, the statements taken by Soviet 
investigators largely, if not exclusively, provide the incriminating evidence.  As this 
information is a product of highly politicized postwar Soviet proceedings against 
suspected collaborators, one must take special care both to articulate the potential 
limitations to the evidence as well as to provide a methodological framework in which to 
understand the information. 
The politicization of its collaborator investigations was in large measure a product of 
the Soviet political memory surrounding the “Great Patriotic War.”  As Nina Tumarkin 
and Amir Weiner argue, Soviet victory during the Second World War functioned as a 
crucial legitimizing myth for the postwar political order.274  According to Weiner, the 
                                                 
274 Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia 
(New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1994), 133.  Amir Weiner, "Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist 
Utopia: Delineating the Soviet Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism," American Historical Review 
104, no. 4 (1999): 1127.  Also see Weiner, Making Sense of War.  Penter argues that the renaissance of 
Ukrainian nationalism after the collapse of the Soviet Union continues to make the existence of Ukrainian 
complicity in the Holocaust politically problematic.  Tanja Penter, "Collaboration on Trial: War Crimes 
Trials in the Ukraine," in The Holocaust in the Courtroom (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
Washington, D.C.: Unpublished, 2005), 2-3. 
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 existence of Soviet collaborators after the war threatened the “purification and 
reintegration” that the myth sought to engender.275  The result of this challenge was an 
unparalleled ferocious persecution of former collaborators, particularly in Ukraine. 276  
For obvious reasons, the Soviet state explicitly targeted ethnic Germans as part of its 
punitive population policy.  By the end of the war, the regime deported more than half of 
the country’s ethnic German population to Kazakhstan.277  Put simply, the Soviet 
Union’s drive to pursue and punish suspected collaborators, and particularly those from 
ethnic minorities, was on a scale and of an intensity that greatly exceeded anything seen 
in Western or Central Europe after the Second World War.278
Scholars, however, are only beginning to grapple with the veracity of these 
proceedings.279  The relative paucity of research using this material is largely a result of 
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 the fact that the Russian Presidential Archive, which is inaccessible to scholars, houses 
most Soviet security service and military records.  These Holocaust-related interrogations 
are unique in that Soviet and later Russian governments have been willing to disclose 
them.  Researchers using these documents must therefore map a course through largely 
uncharted methodological waters before using these sources as historical evidence. 
Thanks to the initial pioneering work of Tanja Penter, it is now possible to reconstruct 
some of the ways that the postwar Soviet political milieu influenced collaborator trials.  
First, the number of proceedings is large.  Out of a postwar population of less than nine 
million in postwar Ukraine, between 1943 and 1957 the NKVD detained 200,173 
suspects.  Second, a disproportionate number of collaborator trials took place in western 
Ukraine.  In 1946, for example, more than half (55 percent) of the 21,338 suspected 
Ukrainian collaborators were from western Ukraine, despite the fact that the region 
contained less than one quarter of Ukraine’s population.280  Third, Soviet investigators 
disproportionately targeted ethnic minorities, such as ethnic Germans.  Although ethnic 
Germans comprised 1.3 percent of Ukraine’s population, in western Ukraine they 
accounted for nearly a quarter (22 percent) of suspected collaborators.281  If one accepts 
Weiner’s thesis that the Soviet Union’s efforts to root out former collaborators was part 
                                                 
280 Penter, "Collaboration on Trial: War Crimes Trials in the Ukraine," 4. 
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 of a broad internal “quest for purity,” then, as Penter argues, it was focused on 
traditionally suspect ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union’s relatively newly acquire 
territory in western Ukraine.282  Moreover, given the geographic distribution of 
Volksdeutschen auxiliary units, this geographic focus likely reflects a plausible 
distribution of perpetrators.  The ethnic Germans in the region around Odessa were 
therefore logically the precise ethnic and geographic cohort that the Soviet Union 
targeted in its postwar collaborator investigations. 
Although little historical analysis of Soviet security services like the NKVD or the 
KGB exists, it is possible to create a skeletal summary of the proceedings against 
suspected collaborators.  As Penter concludes, investigators charged the majority of 
suspected collaborators with war crimes under legislation enacted by the Supreme Soviet 
of the Soviet Union in April 1943.  In addition, beginning as early as 1941, special 
military tribunals, which adjudicated cases based on Soviet criminal law, tried the 
majority of suspected collaborators.  There were, however, two important differences.  
First, unlike conventional criminal courts, military tribunal trials could follow an 
indictment after only twenty-four hours, thus making it very difficult for the defendant to 
prepare a defense.  Second, except for collaborators sentenced to death, there was no 
possibility of appealing the decisions of the military tribunals.  Even when convicted 
collaborators escaped the death penalty, they were nevertheless subject to punishment of 
fifteen to twenty years of hard labor.  Third, the use of “military tribunals” was not 
limited to the immediate postwar period.  Rather, as late as 1988—at the twilight of the 
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 Soviet regime—military tribunals in Kiev continued to issue death sentences against 
former auxiliary policemen.283  Given that the NKVD and later the KGB handled all of 
the investigations that were subsequently shared with West German prosecutors, it is 
likely that suspected ethnic German perpetrators during the late 1950s and 1960s 
appeared before military tribunals in Ukraine.284
Unlike highly publicized show trials during the late 1930s, proceedings against 
Ukrainian collaborators took place under a virtual media blackout.  For example, of the 
633 trials that took place between July and August 1943, only seven were open to the 
public.285  If, as Penter suggests, this silence was an effort to cover up the use of torture 
to extract confessions, then it appears that the use of physical and mental coercion was 
systematic.286  As one West German investigator noted in his post-interrogation report, 
prior to the Second World War the NKVD arrested the interviewee, brutally beat him 
with wooden and rubber batons during his interrogation, and sentenced him to ten years 
of forced labor in the Ural mountains without trial.287  The likely use of torture to extract 
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 information therefore remains one of the most methodologically problematic aspects of 
using these documents as a historical source. 
In addition, based on an initial textual analysis, it appears that Soviet investigators 
composed statements attributed to confessed ethnic German perpetrators.  In the course 
of their interrogations, the statements that suspects allegedly made contain a suspicious 
amount of official Soviet language.  For example, confessing ethnic Germans referred to 
having to wear armbands “with the fascist symbol,” instead of using the term 
“swastika.”288  Likewise, they referred to themselves as “residents of the German 
nationality,” instead of simply as Germans.289  Furthermore, in describing his victims, 
one ethnic German perpetrator confessed to killing “peaceful Soviet citizens of the 
Jewish nationality.”290  Not coincidently, in reexamining the death sentences for all 
eleven members of the Rastadt auxiliary police unit in 1967, the Supreme Court of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic referred to “the annihilation of peaceful citizens of 
the Jewish nationality.”291  Given that all of the ethnic German suspects had little formal 
education and that none were Communist Party members, it seems unlikely that they 
would have been able to speak the regime’s political language with such fluency.  One 
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 must therefore recognize that these types of Soviet interrogations are a source that was 
heavily adapted, if not entirely composed by Soviet security service investigators.292
In light of these limitations, how can scholars employ this type of source as historical 
evidence?  First, whenever possible, scholars should corroborate the information 
provided by Soviet interrogations with that available from contemporary sources.293  In 
the case of the Transnistria’s ethnic German auxiliary police, both contemporary 
documents and postwar West German interrogations confirm its existence and indicate 
some of the details provided by Soviet interrogations.  Furthermore, based on the work of 
recent scholars on the participation of Eastern Europeans in the Holocaust, the accounts 
provided by the Soviet interrogations fit an overall pattern.294
Second, scholars must take into consideration the context of the interrogations.  All of 
the interrogations related to the Transnistria’s ethnic German auxiliary police occurred 
after the 1956 Twentieth Party Congress and N.S. Khrushchev’s “secret speech.”  
Although particularly during the L.I. Brezhnev era, the Soviet state actively pursued a 
vigorous official memory of the “Great Patriotic War,” by the late 1950s and 1960s the 
politicized nature of the proceedings had cooled somewhat.  For example, despite the fact 
that the Soviet Union portrayed communists as the “supervictim” of fascism at the 
expense of European Jewry, the vast majority of victims to whom these interrogations 
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294 Although Martin Dean’s account deals largely with ethnic Ukrainian and Belarusian perpetrators, the 
Soviet interrogations support many of his overall conclusions.  Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust. 
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 refer are Jews and are identified as such in the Soviet documents.295  In addition, as the 
case of the Rastadt ethnic German auxiliary police indicates, a sizable portion of the 
defendants were already convicted in the late 1940s, and by the late 1950s and 1960s 
were already serving lengthy prison sentences for collaborating with the Germans during 
the occupation.296  According to the indictment records, Soviet investigators reopened a 
murder investigation of individuals whom the state had either already investigated or 
convicted of collaboration on the basis of new evidence.297  Given the changed political 
climate of the late Khrushchev and early Brezhnev years, the fact that Soviet 
interrogators devoted such energy to establishing the culpability of a group of previously 
investigated collaborators for new charges of explicitly murdering Jews speaks to the fact 
that these investigations were likely not mere political trials.298  If anything, the specific 
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 circumstances of the case suggest that there was little political motivation for 
investigators to pursue these charges.299
 By dint of the Sitz im Leben of these investigations, can scholars trust the information 
as accurate?  Using similar sources, Jan T. Gross contends that scholars should accept a 
“particular account as fact until we find persuasive arguments to the contrary.”300  While 
there are merits to Gross’s approach, in light of the above limitations, a more cautious 
methodology is in order.  Although Soviet investigators vigorously examined the crimes 
of the Transnistria’s ethnic German auxiliary police in a seemingly apolitical fashion, 
they nevertheless refracted and composed witness statements through their own 
ideological lenses.  Despite the fact that the underlying information is likely credible, 
scholars must understand and treat these interrogation “transcripts” as paraphrased 
statements written by Soviet security personnel.  Moreover, the inherent imprecision of 
these types of sources, combined with the problematic circumstances under which 
suspects made their statements, makes conclusions about individual culpability difficult.  
Whereas these interrogations provide relatively little credible information about personal 
guilt, they contribute detailed information about the Transnistria’s ethnic German 
perpetrators as a group.  With these important limitations in mind, the preceding thesis 
treats all Soviet interrogation “transcripts” as summaries written by well-informed Soviet 
investigators. 
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